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Now that the 2016 election results are available by town for New Hampshire, I thought I would take a look at where libertarian candidates tended to do well or poorly, and how that pattern compared with conservative versus progressive support by town.

To measure libertarian voting by town, I used different variables in different years.

For 2008, I used:

  • Ron Paul vote share in the Republican presidential primary,
  • Libertarian Party vote share in the general presidential election (both Bob Barr and George Phillies had separate Libertarian candidacies in New Hampshire that year),
  • Libertarian Party vote share in the general gubernatorial election.

For 2012, I used:

  • Ron Paul vote share in the Republican presidential primary,
  • Libertarian Party and Ron Paul write-in vote share in the general presidential election,
  • Andrew Hemingway vote share in the Republican gubernatorial primary of 2014. (So this is sort of a 2012-4 measure really.)

For 2016, I used:

  • Rand Paul vote share in the Republican presidential primary (he had dropped out of the race, but over 1% of voters voted for him anyway),
  • Frank Edelblut vote share in the Republican gubernatorial primary,
  • Libertarian Party vote share in the general presidential election,
  • Libertarian Party and Aaron Day vote share in the general U.S. Senate election.

I also calculated conservatism vs. progressivism by town for 2012 and 2016.

For 2012 conservative voting, I used:

  • Republican Party general presidential election vote share,
  • Republican Party general gubernatorial election vote share (2012),
  • Republican Party general gubernatorial election vote share (2014).

For 2016 conservative voting, I used:

  • Republican Party general presidential election vote share,
  • Republican Party and Aaron Day vote share in the general U.S. Senate election,
  • Republican Party general gubernatorial election vote share.

I also looked at how these variables correlated with each other. The strongest correlations I found outside the Republican candidates’ correlations with each other were between LP + Day Senate 2016 vote share and Ron Paul 2012 primary vote share (r=0.51), LP + Day Senate 2016 vote share and Trump vote share (r=0.37), Rand 2016 and Ron 2012 primary vote share (r=0.32), LP + Day Senate 2016 vote share and Edelblut ’16 vote share (r=0.30), Johnson ’12 + Ron Paul write-ins and Ron Paul 2012 primary vote share (r=0.51), Trump vote share and Ron Paul 2012 primary vote share (r=0.45), Paul ’12 and Paul ’08 vote share (r=0.49), Paul ’08 and Hemingway ’14 vote share (r=0.43), and Paul ’12 and Hemingway ’14 vote share (r=0.34). Interestingly, the Johnson-Weld ticket really didn’t correlate with anything else at all, suggesting that most of their voters were simply anti-Clinton and anti-Trump, not libertarian leaners. Most of those voters probably won’t stick around for future Libertarian candidacies unless they don’t have a lot of options.

These correlations also imply that a lot of Ron Paul’s 2012 primary vote came from disaffected, non-conservative, potentially populist or nationalist Republicans. This is consistent with what I reported here on Pileus years ago about how Ron Paul in 2012 added a bunch of anti-establishment, moderate to liberal independents and Republicans to his libertarian base. It also suggests, perhaps, some reason for optimism about the Trump phenomenon. A lot of his voters are simply alienated and not that strongly ideological. If they could vote for both Ron Paul in 2012 and Donald Trump in 2016, these people must be ideologically flexible, even if consistently anti-establishment.

So where can you find libertarians, progressives, and conservatives in New Hampshire? These maps tell the tale. (Unincorporated townships and towns with fewer than 100 votes are not mapped.)

nhlib16 nhlib12 nhlib08 nhcon16 nhcon12

Please note that each variable is recentered each year, so that it is impossible to compare towns across years in any absolute sense (“this town is becoming more libertarian” is an inference you absolutely cannot make from these data), though you could make comparisons over time, relative to the average town in New Hampshire (“this town used to be quite a bit more libertarian than other towns, but now it’s only average” is something you could say based on these data). The recentering has to be done because different candidates run and are included in the calculations in different years.

Now then, where are the libertarians? The results aren’t greatly different from those I’ve reported before, with New Hampshire’s most libertarian towns generally lying in the Appalachian mountains and foothills of the western part of the state. However, in 2016 there is a notable change, with the libertarian center of gravity shifting southward to Cheshire and western Hillsborough counties. This surprised me a bit at first, but it makes sense once you consider that conservatarian Republican gubernatorial candidate Frank Edelblut is from western Hillsborough County and absolutely dominated the vote in his hometown and nearby towns, coming close to knocking off then-presumptive nominee Chris Sununu (now governor elect) statewide.

Republicans, meanwhile, are much stronger in the southeastern third of the state than elsewhere in 2012, but in 2016 they had more even support throughout the state, making clear inroads into the relatively deprived North Country. This is consistent with the general shift of the party to the nationalist radical right with accompanying loss of support among upscale groups and growth among the white working class.

Scatter plots make these phenomena clearer (click to expand).

The last scatter plot, in particular, shows that between 2012 and 2016 Republicans lost, relatively to the average town, in upscale towns like Hanover, Bedford, New Castle, Amherst, Hollis, and New London (most of these are strongly Republican towns, but Hanover is the most Democratic town in the state). Meanwhile, Republicans gained in the small towns of the North Country, places like Landaff, Berlin, Northumberland, and Millsfield. Libertarians (not necessarily Libertarian Party, but libertarianish candidates) look to have gained in western Hillsborough County, towns like Greenville, Mason, and New Ipswich (all heavily GOP). Again, this pattern really reflects the strength of Republican Frank Edelblut in his primary.

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There’s been some debate about whether independent conservatarian candidate Aaron Day (former chairman of the Free State Project Board of Directors) cost Republican Kelly Ayotte her U.S. Senate seat at this past election. Skeptics point to the fact that Day and Libertarian Brian Chabot between them about equaled Gary Johnson’s vote percentage in the presidential race (Johnson-Weld got 4.2% in New Hampshire, Chabot and Day between them about 4.1%). They say Day merely siphoned off Libertarian voters from Chabot, not Republican voters from Ayotte.

They’re probably wrong. Here’s why.

First, let’s note that Clinton and Trump were the two least popular major-party presidential candidates in the history of polling. In particular, Trump was (and is) by far the least popular presidential candidate (and now, president-elect) that we’ve ever seen. Under those conditions, you expect an outsized third-party vote share in the presidential race. By contrast, Maggie Hassan and Kelly Ayotte, the two U.S. Senate candidates, were reasonably popular – and about equally so. So we should expect a small third-party vote share in the U.S. Senate race. The fact that the third-party vote share in the Senate race equalled that in the presidential race therefore suggests something else is going on – perhaps a particularly strong independent candidacy. Libertarian Chabot got 1.7% of the vote, while independent Day got 2.4% of the vote – so if one of them was the particularly strong candidate, it was Day.

To try to see whether Day was siphoning off Republican or Libertarian votes, I looked at town-by-town results for all 239 New Hampshire jurisdictions with voters in this race. I then looked at how the number of Libertarian and Republican presidential votes by town correlated with Day’s support. The results are in the figure below.

Aaron Day Vote Sources

The coefficient estimate on percentage of the vote for Trump-Pence in a town is 0.05 and is highly statistically significant, as you can see by the tiny confidence interval on the estimate. This estimate means that for every 20 additional Trump-Pence voters in a town, one additional voter cast a vote for Day in the Senate race.

The coefficient estimate on percentage of the vote for Johnson-Weld in a town is 0.08 but not statistically significant. This estimate implies that for every 12 additional Johnson-Weld voters in a town, one additional voter cast a vote for day in the Senate race — but again, we can’t be sure this is really any different from zero.

Day’s vote share was a little more than one-twentieth of the Trump-Pence ticket’s in New Hampshire. In other words, we can be reasonably confident that almost all of Day’s electoral support came from Republicans, not Libertarians.

To verify that Day specifically was the spoiler, not Brian Chabot, we can do the same exercise for Brian Chabot’s vote shares by town. The figure below shows those results.

Brian Chabot Vote Sources

Look at the difference! Chabot pulled overwhelmingly from Johnson-Weld voters. For every four additional Johnson-Weld voters in a town, Chabot got an additional one vote. Meanwhile, Chabot did siphon a few Republicans. For every 80 additional Trump-Pence votes in a town, Chabot got about one vote. Still, these results suggest that over half of Chabot’s support came from Libertarians, not Republicans.

Now, Kelly Ayotte lost by 1,000 votes, just over 0.1 percentage points. My estimates suggest that without Aaron Day in the race, Kelly Ayotte would have won her race by about 15,000 votes, similar to Republican Chris Sununu’s margin of victory in the governor’s race.

Is it possible that without Aaron Day in the race, those 16,000 or so disaffected Republicans would still have voted for some other third-party candidate or a write-in, or just that race blank? Sure, it’s possible. We can’t rule out that possibility because we can’t do an experiment in which we randomly assign some towns’ ballots to have Aaron Day on them and some not to have him on them. But at minimum these results strongly suggest that Kelly Ayotte disaffected a decisive share of Republican voters who went for Trump and Sununu but not for her.

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In Which I Lose a Bet

Last year, I offered a bet that if an election were held this year in Catalonia, Catalan independentist parties would win a majority of valid, nonblank votes. One was, and they didn’t. The only person to take me up on the bet was Bernat Gispert, who bet me dinner next time I’m in Barcelona, hoping that he would lose. Alas, I owe him dinner now!

Why didn’t independentists win? Shortly after I offered that bet, in November 2014, support for independence declined precipitously, with a June 2015 survey from respected outfit CEO putting opposition to independence at 50-43%. I explored some reasons for that decline in another post, even as I predicted a rise in support before the September 27 election (I was right about that!).

In the rest of this post, I will explore the results from Sunday’s election in greater depth and what they imply about the views of the median voter in Catalonia. Here are the party results in votes and seats.
election results

The two independentist lists, JxS and CUP, between them won a majority of seats but only 48.0% of the valid, nonblank votes. The UDC is a Catalanist party that used to be in a longterm alliance with one of the constituent elements of the JxS list, leaving this year over the issue of independence. Their leaders have favored confederacy or freely associated state status for Catalonia, which international lawyers generally consider a form of independence. However, they opposed JxS’s roadmap to independence because it involved an illegal declaration of independence. Their campaign focused on “the power of good judgment (seny)” and was aimed at voters who might be pro-independence but are above all pro-stability and pro-business. The leader of the list has said that the UDC’s votes cannot be considered votes either for “yes” or for “no” to independence.

Catalonia Yes We Can, a radical-left list, supports a referendum on independence but is internally divided on whether Catalonia should actually become independent. The leader of their list has likewise said that their votes cannot be considered either “yes” or “no” on the issue.

Therefore, independentists are claiming that when one adds together the votes for the two independentist lists (JxS+CUP), they exceed the votes for the anti-independence lists (PSC+PPC+C’s), 48.0%-39.4%. JxS supporters, in particular, are claiming a mandate for the roadmap to independence. To their credit, the radical-left party CUP says that this is not enough for a unilateral declaration of independence. Because their seats are essential to an independentist coalition, CUP will likely be able to negotiate with JxS some amendments to the roadmap. One of those amendments is likely to be a definitive referendum, in which the Catalonian government agrees to respect whatever outcome the majority decides, declaring independence if a majority votes “yes” and shutting down the secessionist process for a generation if the majority votes “no.” Of course, Spain says such a referendum is illegal and will try to stop it by imprisoning officials, etc. It’s not clear that they’ll be able to prevent it from happening, however. Nor is it clear that the hardline unionists will boycott this vote as they did the 9-N consultation, if they know a declaration of independence will immediately follow a “yes” victory.

Do the majority of Catalans support independence? It’s impossible to be certain. Suppose half of the minor parties’ (PACMA, RC-EV, Ganemos, Pirata) electorates support independence. That adds 0.6% to the independentist total. Then add a mere 20% of the votes won by the anti-roadmap but pro-right-to-decide UDC and CSQEP. That adds another 2.3%. That extra 2.9% would give independence an extremely slender 50.9-49.1% majority. I don’t think it is plausible to think that fully half of CSQEP and UDC voters support independence.

A final issue is that of votes from Catalans abroad. The Spanish government was responsible for sending them ballots, but apparently the vast majority did not receive them. Catalans abroad are overwhelmingly pro-independence. The returns from international ballots for the Barcelona province allegedly show more than 65% voting for the independentist lists. Turnout from Catalans abroad was a mere 7%, so clearly there was some kind of snafu. The voting period for Catalans abroad has been extended to Friday, but it’s not clear this will resolve the problem for most.

How would 70% participation among the 200,000 Catalans living abroad affect the result of the election? (This is just below the 77% turnout overall for this election.) If we add 0.7*200000*0.65=91,000 votes to the independentist lists and 0.7*200000*.35=49,000 votes to the other lists, the independentists still end up with just 48.56% of valid, nonblank votes.

As a political scientist, I don’t believe in “mandates.” Electoral choices revolve around many different issues, differential turnout can affect results, voters are often ignorant of party platforms and how policies affect outcomes, and cyclical majorities and different preference intensities complicate any attempt to come up with a “will of the people” under the best of circumstances. Yet if Catalonia’s election tells us anything about the position of the median voter on independence, it is probably this: the median voter may well support independence, but not a roadmap that includes a unilateral declaration of independence (at least not yet). The new government of Catalonia, whenever it forms, would do well to proceed with caution.

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On September 27, Catalonia, an “autonomous community” of Spain, votes in a regional election that will likely determine whether the region declares independence from Spain. The Economist and other global news outlets have generally not taken the movement very seriously, which is a grave mistake. According to a series of new polls, the independentists are likely to win this election, and if they do win, they will pursue a roadmap ending in a proclamation of independence within 18 months. It would be the first secession from an industrialized democracy since either Iceland (1944) or Ireland (1922), depending on how you count (Iceland had full internal self-government from 1918).

Catalan independence may well be a good outcome for the world. There are several reasons why Catalonia is likely to be more successful as an independent state than Scotland would have been.

First, Catalonia is significantly wealthier than the rest of the Spain and suffers a significant annual net fiscal drain to the Spanish treasury, on the order of 6-10% of GDP. Catalonia is also the least corrupt region of Spain.

The stock markets also suggest that independence might benefit or at least not hurt Catalonia. I examined the INDEXCAT produced by the Barcelona stock exchange, an index of all Catalan-owned, publicly traded companies on its exchange, to see how its prices responded to changes in the probability of independence. Since September 11, 2012, when the independence movement reached a popular crescendo on the streets, the INDEXCAT has grown 48.7%, compared to 26.2% for the IBEX 35 index of major Spanish firms, to 31% for the German DAX, to 24.4% for the Dow, and 21.6% for the EUROSTOXX index. This chart produced by the Catalan Business Circle shows that the fastest growth for the INDEXCAT occurred during the period when independence seemed most likely to occur, the late 2012 to late 2013 period when support for independence generally topped 55% of those expressing an opinion in yes-no questions and it still seemed possible a true referendum might be held.
CCN_Indexcat

Then I looked at how the INDEXCAT responded to the recent turnaround in polling for the September 27 elections. After several months of declining support for independence and independentist parties, public opinion started to turn around dramatically just two weeks ago. (Right after I predicted it would!) There have been three “polling shocks” since September 1. (The English-language Wikipedia article on these polls is rapidly and accurately updated.) The first and most significant occurred on the night of September 3, when three polls were released, all showing a pro-independence majority, after a series of July and August polls showing the independentist lists well short. We should expect investors to update their views about the likelihood of independence immediately and to trade on those views as soon as possible. Within a few minutes, the new market prices should reflect the public information. The INDEXCAT dropped just 0.31% between close on September 3 and five minutes after opening on September 4. That is consistent with a small negative impact of independence on major Catalan firms, but let’s look at the other shocks.

On the morning of September 9, a modest negative polling shock occurred, as following a string of four polls showing a clear independentist seats majority, a poll from the respected Spanish government research outfit CIS showed the slenderest of possible majorities for the independentists, just 68 out of 135 seats. It’s hard to figure out exactly when that information went public. A single tweet with the results went out at 9:00 AM exactly, but it seems to have broken an embargo, and those results weren’t confirmed until 9:30. In any event, between 9:00 and 9:10 AM, the INDEXCAT fell 0.22% and didn’t change much over the following hour. These results are consistent with a small positive impact of independence on major Catalan firms.

Finally, over last weekend a new series of polls seemingly have shown the CIS result to be an outlier, once again confirming a clear seats majority for independentists. Between market close on Friday and 9:05 AM Monday, INDEXCAT rose 0.26%. This outcome is consistent with a small positive impact of independence on major Catalan firms.

Unfortunately, I cannot calculate the expected value of independence for publicly traded Catalan firms as I did for Scottish companies, because there are no betting markets on Catalan independence or the majority in the coming election. (Unbelievable but true.) Still, on balance, the results suggest that investors expect Catalan companies to become more, not less, profitable with independence. In turn, that finding implies that the transition costs of independence are excessively hyped.

The second reason why I think Catalan independence may be good for the world is that the Spanish government has not given any concessions to Catalans to prevent them from voting for independence. To the contrary, Spain has tried to recentralize powers and has even hinted at using military force against Catalans (almost certainly a bluff). The contrast with Britain’s response to Scotland could not be stronger. If Catalans vote against independence, it would send a bad signal to Spain: that threats work to deter secessionism. Moreover, it would leave Catalonia and all the other autonomous communities vulnerable to even more severe recentralization policies. Unilateral disarmament more often invites aggression than defuses it.

The final reason why Catalan independence would be good for the world is that Spain’s existing pattern of decentralization is dysfunctional, as just about everyone recognizes. Spain’s autonomous communities racked up excessive debt during the 2000s boom and have required bailouts from the central government (PDF). Those bailouts establish a moral-hazard incentive for autonomous communities to continue profligate spending and rely on the central government for assistance when borrowing becomes difficult. Why did the autonomous communities rack up excessive debt in the first place? Stanford political scientist Jonathan Rodden has shown that when there are no external balanced-budget requirements on lower-level governments in decentralized systems, the only way to encourage fiscal discipline is to require the lower-level governments to pay for their own spending mostly out of own-source revenues and to make credible promises to let these governments go bankrupt if they cannot pay back their bondholders. The bond markets then provide fiscal discipline: subcentral governments maintain fiscal discipline because if they borrow too much, they will end up paying higher interest rates. But what happened in Spain was that the autonomous communities (with the exception of Euskadi and Navarre) had vast spending rights and responsibilities but few sources of independent income. They depended on central government grants, and thus had little incentive to spend the money responsibly. So you got things like this.

If Catalonia leaves Spain, it will be a significant fiscal shock to Spain. One relatively easy way for the Spanish central government to deal with the shock is to reduce transfers to the autonomous communities and allow them more independent taxation powers. The autonomous communities will complain about the burden-shifting, but the more nationalist communities will be happy to enjoy more fiscal autonomy. Moreover, fiscal competition between independent Catalonia and rump Spain could encourage both governments to adopt more efficient and less corrupt policies.

Catalonia isn’t a free-market paradise. For instance, the regional government passed a protectionist law limiting shop hours that the Spanish government wisely overruled. Politics throughout the Mediterranean region are toxic right now, and Catalonia is not immune. The European Central Bank’s unconscionable policies of monetary austerity have kept southern Europe in economic crisis for years, and the region’s voters have turned against wealth creation and free markets as a result. That’s a different problem with different solutions. But in the medium term, would you rather see Catalonia as part of a Spain ruled by a coalition between the corrupt left (PSOE) and the extreme left (Podemos), since the PP will lose the next election, or would you rather see an independent Catalonia in which the largest party has always been of the center-right (Convergence)?

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I don’t blog much here anymore, in part because I’ve been too busy with Ethics & Economics Education, and in part because I find it easier to share quick thoughts on Twitter. Here’s a little tweetstorm I had recently on Catalonia’s independence vote next month:

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The search for a legacy always begins in earnest as presidents approach the final years of their time in office. Josh Kraushaar (National Journal) has an interesting piece on the Obama legacy. A key passage:

By ignoring the electorate and steering the country in an unmistakably progressive direction his final two years in office, he’s ensuring that his presidency will be more of an eight-year mirage for liberals, rather than one known for winning lasting support for policies that would move the country in a leftward direction.

All presidents have legacies, of course, but they are rarely what they might have imagined when they entered office.

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Bryan Caplan argues that social conservatives should prefer libertines to hypocrites, contrary to the common meme that “at least hypocrites have moral standards.” The argument is pretty simple: hypocrites seem to share your values, but when you least expect it, they will betray you. So far as it goes, the argument is pretty convincing.

But libertines and hypocrites aren’t the only two possible types of people who fail to live up to putative moral standards. A true hypocrite doesn’t actually have moral standards but merely pretends to them. After all, if one has moral standards, they should affect your behavior appreciably, but the hypocrite simply does what (s)he wants anyway while feigning belief in a stricter standard. That’s what makes hypocrites so dangerous.

The third type of moral failure is weakness of will. The weak-willed believe in moral standards and generally live up to them, but occasionally fail due to weakness of will. The weak of will acknowledge their flaws and try to do better, but you know they will sometimes fail. Unlike the hypocrite, the weak-willed is open about his/her failings, and therefore when dealing with them you know better what you’re dealing with. Unlike the libertine, the weak-willed often actually do live up to moral standards, so long as it isn’t too hard to do so.

Therefore, social conservatives should rank moral failures thus: 1) weakness of will, 2) libertinism, 3) hypocrisy. What some social conservatives praise when they praise “hypocrisy” is probably actually weakness of will, if they took some time to reflect on the distinctions.

I thought about these distinctions while considering the case of corrupt socialists. In the Spanish news today is the number-three man at Podemos, the extreme-left party in Spain (more or less their answer to Greece’s Syriza – the relations between the two parties are extremely close). This man, Juan Carlos Monedero, took half a million dollars from left-wing governments in Latin America (most particularly the Venezuelan dictatorship) for “consulting” and failed to pay taxes on it. He also defrauded his university, a technical college in Madrid, which was contractually guaranteed 20% of his consulting contracts.

Does this fraud evince hypocrisy or weakness of will? After all, Podemos has taken the lead in denouncing corruption in other parties, whom they call “la casta.” Withholding taxes from the government has to be a cardinal sin for socialists. Can true-believing socialists excuse the act on the grounds that “at least he has principles”? Or is he really pretending at having socialist principles at all?

It’s difficult to answer this question, because socialism attracts the unprincipled. If you want to enrich yourself through government, there’s no better way to do it than to denounce corruption and promote populist measures against the rich in order to get elected, and then once elected, use state-controlled companies to feather your own nest. When the state controls the economy, it controls wealth, and it will be extremely tempting to funnel some of that wealth to yourself and your friends.

Not knowing more about the man, it’s difficult to know whether Monedero – and quite possibly the other leaders of Podemos – are hypocrites or merely weak-willed. But that fact alone shows one of the inherent problems of socialism: really existing socialism either brings about rule by the already corrupt or corrupts those who rule.

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