How does globalisation, especially foreign direct investment, influence the risk of intrastate conflict? While several prominent studies have found that globalisation reduces the probability of civil war, we use new data and methods to approach the question. In particular, we test for the possibility that foreign investment is endogenous to conflict risk and appropriately use inward foreign investment stock rather than net inflow to measure an economy’s exposure to international capital markets. We find no evidence that foreign investment affects civil conflict, suggesting that governments’ fundamental security interests trump the economic losses they can expect to suffer from failing to compromise with potential rebel groups.
Archive for the ‘Political Science’ Category
Last week Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice would be suspending its adoption of state civil forfeiture cases through its “Equitable Sharing” program. To review, civil asset forfeiture is the procedure by which law enforcement seizes property suspected of having been associated with a crime, and then auctions it off and uses the money for its own purposes. Under federal law, asset forfeiture is easy: the agency must simply show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was associated with a crime, and then the owner bears the burden of proving her innocence. Under the Equitable Sharing program, the Department of Justice “adopts” state cases in states in which forfeiture laws are stricter, thereby implicating the weaker federal standard, then shares up to 80% of the proceeds of these forfeitures with state and local law enforcement.
The system creates perverse incentives for seizing the cash, vehicles, and businesses of innocent people, as last year’s blockbuster investigation by the Washington Post revealed. Moreover, the Equitable Sharing program intentionally circumvents state law. The Institute for Justice’s 2010 study Policing for Profit showed that states with stricter civil asset forfeiture procedures saw substantially greater Equitable Sharing revenues.
Thus, Holder’s announcement is very welcome. Still, as Radley Balko points out, the new policy contains some big exceptions:
. . . (1) seizures by state and local authorities working together with federal authorities in a joint task force; (2) seizures by state and local authorities that are the result of joint federal-state investigations or that are coordinated with federal authorities as part of ongoing federal investigations; or (3) seizures pursuant to federal seizure warrants, obtained from federal courts to take custody of assets originally seized under state law.
According to the WaPo story, only 57% of Equitable Sharing proceeds came from state-only investigations, so the new policy should cut payments to state and local agencies by about half. When it comes to big forfeitures, the new policy creates an obvious incentive for local law enforcement to bring in a federal investigator to create a pretext for adoption. Moreover, many of those forfeitures that are no longer adopted will still be pursued under state law, simply with a higher evidentiary threshold in many cases. Thus, the total amount of civil forfeiture that occurs in this country can be expected to drop by only a small fraction of the current annual average total.
To get a better sense of how this policy change will affect asset forfeiture in the states, I will present some numbers from the new asset forfeiture dataset that we are compiling for the fourth edition of Freedom in the 50 States. We have data on Equitable Sharing proceeds by state from Fiscal Year 2000-01 to Fiscal Year 2012-13, as well as detailed information on state standards for forfeiture.
The following time-series chart shows Equitable Sharing revenues per $1000 of state personal income for several large states: Texas, Florida, California, Illinois, and New York. These data exclude a massive, one-time payout to New York agencies for the Bernie Madoff case.
As the chart shows, Equitable Sharing really began to ramp up in 2006-07. By 2012-13, these five states combined for $228 million in forfeiture revenues from the federal government. For each of the last four years, California was first or second among these five states in forfeiture revenue as a share of the state economy. Probably not coincidentally, California has some of the toughest procedures for civil forfeiture in the country.
In the U.S. as a whole, Equitable Sharing forfeiture revenues totaled $486 million in FY 2012-13, more than double the total of 2004-05. We don’t know just what the total value of assets forfeited in the country is, because states and localities don’t often keep track of the data. Moreover, the Equitable Sharing program includes proceeds of criminal as well as civil forfeiture (criminal forfeiture upon conviction is much less controversial). But from the states for which we do have data, it appears that, at least in the early 2000s, total assets forfeited through state law amounted to about 20-50% more than what the states got from Equitable Sharing. Those figures undercount the losses to victims of forfeiture, because agencies get, at best, market value for what they seize. So it’s quite possible that each year, more than $1 billion in value is taken from property owners through civil asset forfeiture.
Now that the Equitable Sharing program is being curtailed, state laws will matter more. Which states are best positioned to protect property rights in the new order? Here’s a ranking of states as of January 1, 2015 on citizen protections from civil asset forfeiture, based on the burden of proof for showing that the property was connected to a crime, whether there is an “innocent owner” rebuttable presumption, where the proceeds of asset forfeiture go (when they go to the forfeiting agency, there are more incentives for abuse), and whether the state had put any limits on Equitable Sharing already:
1. North Carolina
4. New Mexico
19. New York
24. New Hampshire
27. New Jersey
27. West Virginia
39. Rhode Island
39. South Carolina
42. North Dakota
42. South Dakota
With any luck, Holder’s decision will inaugurate a new round of forfeiture reforms at the state level, as legislators realize that they once again have the power to set policy for their own officials.
Dragnet’s Joe Friday may have never uttered those words, but he would be impressed nonetheless by the facts on crime. There was a fascinating piece by Erik Eckholm in yesterday’s New York Times on the dramatic reductions in crime over the past several decades. Overall, crime peaked in 1991 and has fallen steadily since then.
All of this leads to the big question: why? Is it a change in tactics (e.g., aggressive policing, the “broken window” theory)? Is it a product of an increase in the costs of criminality (e.g., mandatory sentencing and the decision to keep 1.5 million people in prison)? Is it a product of good economic times? Perhaps it simply reflects demographics (e.g., the aging of the population, the decline in teenage pregnancy)? In the end, law professor Franklin E. Zimring (UC-Berkeley) is quoted as describing the search for an explanation as “criminological astrology.”
Max Ehrenfreund (Washington Post Wonkblog) has designated the above “chart of the day” as “something of a Rorschach test. Everyone sees what they want to see in it.” That may be something of an overstatement. Certainly, the advocates of the war on drugs, police militarization, aggressive policing and harsh sentencing laws will view it as evidence that their strategies have worked. They will have the challenge of explaining why similar trends are evident elsewhere, including Canada, that have not embraced the US model. And I am not at all certain of how the Left would make sense of the fact that crime has fallen as inequality has increased.
Will the decline in crime have an impact on public policy? Will it lead to a rethinking of police militarization and mass incarceration? I hold little hope given that public opinion seems immune to the facts.
Even if crime has fallen dramatically, according to Gallup the majority of Americans in most years on record believe that crime is getting worse. As Gallup observes: “federal crime statistics have not been highly relevant to the public’s crime perceptions in recent years.” A public concerned with crime and (willfully) ignorant of the long-term trends will continue to demand an aggressive police presence. And that demand will be met.
With this post, I’m reporting updated results on the ideological ideal points of New Hampshire legislators, introduced previously here. In that analysis, I found that libertarians in the New Hampshire House in 2014 tended to vote with the right (and vice versa) on most roll-call votes scored by the New Hampshire Liberty Alliance. That included votes on bills to prevent localities from acquiring military vehicles for police, to reform civil asset forfeiture, to protect public school students’ privacy, and other civil-liberty issues where you would have expected the left to be more libertarian. In fact, the more left-wing you were, the more likely you were to oppose the libertarian position on those bills.
However, there were a few bills on which the left was more libertarian, mostly dealing with marijuana and other criminal-justice issues. When those were separated out, the analysis revealed a distinct cluster of 10-40 legislators (depending on the strictness of the criteria for inclusion) who tended to vote with the left or center on this just-mentioned subset of social issues but with the center or right, respectively, on the majority of roll-calls: a libertarian(-ish) caucus.
I am now updating the analysis with 2013 roll-calls included, to cover the entire biennial session. I’m also reporting more charts and tables for the geekily inclined.
To recap, I ran a Bayesian IRT analysis with imputation of missing data (abstentions and absences) using R package “pscl.” First, I began with the hypothesis that libertarianism-communitarianism was the first dimension underlying all roll-call votes. This hypothesis seemed to work for most roll-call votes, but it failed on some. In fact, a left-right dimension underlies most legislators’ voting decisions. So I separated out the bills on which the hypothesis failed and ran separate analyses on both sets. That resulted in two dimensions of ideology: how right-wing you are on right-libertarian issues (henceforth, “right-libertarianism”) and how left-wing you are on left-libertarian issues (henceforth, “left-libertarianism”).
I also corrected some errors in the NHLA data (votes coded the wrong way and one individual legislator vote miscoded) and made some different judgment calls from them. I mentioned some differences I had with their inclusion of votes against casino bills as pro-liberty and votes against a domestic violence bill as pro-liberty. I would have dropped them from the analysis if they had made any difference to the results, but they didn’t, so I didn’t bother. However, I did make some more substantial judgments. I dropped two voter ID/registration bills that the NHLA supported (loosening voting requirements). These were party-line votes: libertarian Democrats voted with their party in favor, and libertarian Republicans with their party against. NH’s voter registration rules are extremely lax, and the reform proposals so modest, that I could hardly count these bills, which undid some changes of the 2011-12 legislature, as clearly pro- or anti-liberty. Had I included them, they would have dominated the second dimension, reducing the additional information it supplies beyond mere left-right ideology. Finally, I counted votes in favor of a bill banning prison privatization as anti-liberty and votes against expanding the research and development tax credit as pro-liberty, directly contradicting the NHLA’s positions (but with good reason, I think – the data showed stronger fiscal conservatives voting against the NHLA on both).
There were 404 legislators that served at some point during the 2013-14 session (the maximum at any one time is 400). There were 149 total bills I looked at, but in the end 136 made it into the right-libertarianism analysis and 11 made it into the left-libertarianism analysis.
Another small difference from the last effort is that this time I ran a NOMINATE analysis first to get priors on each dimension for each legislator. The NOMINATE analysis also suggests 2 dimensions of ideology, just rotated slightly differently.
For the geekily inclined, here is a table of the discrimination parameters for the 10 most important bills contributing to the right-libertarianism dimension (here’s the intuition: a higher discrimination parameter means the bill is more important in distinguishing the right-libertarian from the left-communitarian):
bill mean stdev lower upper proliberty antiliberty notvoting hb544 8.27 1.159 5.892 10.343 154 182 68 sb413 6.284 0.894 4.848 8.267 132 202 70 hb271 5.065 0.793 3.508 6.798 155 206 43 hb370 4.19 0.57 3.136 5.281 151 188 65 hb1570 4.048 0.536 2.894 5.226 142 161 101 hb1541 3.939 0.541 3.025 5.418 109 162 133 cacr1 3.938 0.523 3.123 5.086 149 206 49 hb1403 3.775 0.531 2.676 4.933 118 173 113 hb427 3.654 0.505 2.772 4.661 152 185 67 sb120 3.545 0.458 2.756 4.544 119 186 99
All of these were losses for liberty, and given the Democratic control of the House then, that’s not surprising. But only two of them passed both houses and were enacted into law: SB 413, Medicaid expansion, and SB 120, increasing campaign finance reporting and registration requirements. The top bill, HB 544, would have created a state-based Obamacare exchange.
Here are the bills that fed into the second dimension, left-libertarianism vs. right-communitarianism (all 11):
bill mean stdev lower upper proliberty antiliberty notvoting hb573 10.171 0.24 9.735 10.804 286 64 54 hb492 2.092 0.297 1.531 2.94 170 162 72 hb1625 1.492 0.218 1.118 1.99 215 92 97 hb621 1.376 0.177 0.946 1.669 193 136 75 hb1325 0.872 0.147 0.56 1.162 66 219 119 hb249 0.807 0.149 0.566 1.105 266 68 70 hb1237 0.701 0.092 0.551 0.9 231 97 76 hb1577 0.674 0.124 0.475 0.943 209 116 79 hb1501 0.526 0.097 0.253 0.728 211 86 107 sb296 0.429 0.095 0.283 0.638 210 128 66 hb1624 0.327 0.109 0.147 0.567 256 40 108
HB573, medical marijuana legalization, dominates this list. The next on the list, HB492, was marijuana legalization. All of these were victories except Death with Dignity, HB 1325, again predictable given Democratic control of the House. Only medical marijuana and HB1624, modernizing the juvenile justice system, were passed and enacted into law. Of course, some of the victories consisted in defeating bad bills.
Here were the 10 most right-libertarian legislators in the last session:
name party Groen Warren R Sylvia Michael R Meaney Richard R Hoell J.R. R Murphy Keith R Sandblade Emily R Notter Jeanine R Baldasaro Alfred R Lambert George R O'Brien William R
William O’Brien was the 2011-12 Speaker of the House. Several of these legislators are Free State Project movers.
Here were the 10 most left-libertarian legislators in the last session:
name party Winters Joel D O'Flaherty Tim D Vaillancourt Steve R Ketel Stephen D Levasseur Nickolas D Bickford David R Gardner Janice D Friedrich Carol D Arsenault Beth D Carroll Douglas D
Joel Winters was the first FSP mover elected to the state house (2006). Steve Vaillancourt is a left-libertarian gadfly and served in the legislature for close to two decades, before losing this year.
I created an index of libertarianism weighted 3:1 toward right-libertarianism (on the theory that economic and personal freedom are equally important, and right-wingers are better on economics and half of personal freedom, and worse on the other half). Here are the most libertarian legislators according to that blend:
name party Lambert George R Sylvia Michael R Garcia Michael D Hoell J.R. R Sandblade Emily R Pratt Calvin R Warden Mark R Meaney Richard R Murphy Keith R Tasker Kyle R
Here is a plot of the legislators on both dimensions, color-coded by party (click to expand):
Note that a handful of communitarians do now reveal themselves: William Butynski, Daniel Hansberry, Katherine Rogers, Leigh Webb, Deanna Rollo, Richard Eaton, Mary Nelson (all Dems).
Constitute.org is a useful website designed by political scientists to let researchers search for and compare constitutional texts on particular topics. Here for instance is a search on secession clauses. Although one of the site’s creators, Zachary Elkins, says that 22 states contemplate some process for state divorce, only three constitutions expressly authorize some part of the country to secede: Ethiopia, Liechtenstein, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Ethiopia lets each people or nationality secede by a supermajority vote of its legislature, Liechtenstein lets each commune secede (I believe this was an addition of the 2003 constitution), and St. Kitts and Nevis lets Nevis secede by a supermajority referendum vote.
In addition to these, Britain’s Northern Ireland Act of 1998 lets the majority of Northern Irelanders decide to join the Republic of Ireland, and the constitution of Uzbekistan lets Karakalpakstan secede with the consent of the Uzbekistan government.
It would be interesting to see how many states define themselves as “indivisible,” thus tying a government’s hands and preventing it from authorizing secession. A search on the term brings up some irrelevant cases, but 72 constitutions contain the term.
The New Hampshire Liberty Alliance does a Liberty Rating each year in which they analyze liberty-related roll-call votes of state representatives and senators and grade them. (The NHLA is a great government accountability organization, by the way, and well worth supporting; a lifetime membership is only $100.)
I used their roll-call votes for the 2014 N.H. House of Representatives but analyzed them differently (I also corrected three errors in their spreadsheet). The vast majority of roll-call votes are on economic issues, where conservative Republicans and libertarians line up. So the Liberty Rating might overstate how libertarian conservative House members really are, if those social issues that are voted on are disproportionately important. The Liberty Rating tries to assess how important each vote is, but the way they do it is arbitrary and subject to dispute (for instance, they rate a bill restricting the sharing of public school student information as highest-priority, on a level with legalizing marijuana and three times as important as a bill enacting occupational licensure of medical technicians). Furthermore, some of their bills are disputably freedom-related: they rated as negative a bill creating a new crime of “domestic violence.” Now, that bill might or might not have been a good idea, but it doesn’t seem like a liberty-related issue, unless you’re an anarchist who wants to legalize everything, including violence.
I used Item Response Theory in a Bayesian framework to estimate the ideal points of legislators in two dimensions. Let me unpack that statement for the layman. I let the data speak for itself. If legislators who generally voted libertarian voted in favor of a bill, the data are telling me that that bill is liberty-enhancing. If legislators who generally vote libertarian split on a bill, then maybe it’s not a liberty issue. Some votes might be “harder” or “easier” than others, like questions on a test. Even a pretty libertarian legislator might vote the wrong way on a hard vote, like a bill legalizing physician-assisted suicide (“Death with Dignity”, HB 1325 in 2014), which failed 219-66.
Using the R package “pscl,” I first hypothesized that all 93 roll-call votes in 2014 reflected a single ideological dimension: each legislator’s degree of libertarian-ness. We could line up all legislators’ ideal points in ideological space along a single line, and that line would be the best way to predict how all the legislators vote on any given issue.
That hypothesis ended up being wrong. On 84 roll-call votes, I couldn’t reject that hypothesis, but on 9, I could. Those were votes on which those voters who tended to vote in a libertarian direction on the other 84 votes tended to vote in an anti-libertarian direction instead – and conversely, those voters who usually voted anti-libertarian actually tended to vote libertarian on those 9 votes.
What were those 9 votes?
- HB1237, prohibiting local sex-offender residency restrictions (passed 231-97)
- HB1325, Death with Dignity (failed 66-219)
- HB1501, mandating licensing of outpatient abortion facilities (killed 211-86) (the NHLA generally stays out of abortion bills, but they believed, and I agree, that business licensing is the wrong way for pro-lifers to restrict abortion)
- HB1577, allowing alkaline hydrosis for the disposal of human remains (passed 209-116)
- HB1624, modernizing the juvenile justice system (passed 256-40)
- HB1625, decriminalizing small amounts of marijuana (passed 215-92)
- HB249, mandating employer use of E-Verify (killed 266-68)
- HB492, legalizing marijuana (passed 170-162)
- SB296, discriminating in favor of veterans in public employment (killed 210-128)
What do all these issues have in common? They’re social issues on which libertarians make common cause with the left! And note that apart from Death with Dignity, libertarians won on every one of these bills. Part of that has to do with the fact that socially liberal Democrats were in the majority in 2014, and part of it has to do with the fact that libertarians are numerous enough in the House to swing some close votes, like the legalization of marijuana.
There were also a few votes without a clear libertarian position; in statistical jargon, they didn’t “load” onto the first ideological dimension at all:
- SB318, establishing the crime of domestic violence (passed 325-3)
- SB336, banning deer baiting on public land (killed 200-85)
- SB366, establishing two casinos in New Hampshire (killed 173-172)
Arguably these roll-calls shouldn’t have been included in the Liberty Rating.
So I divided the roll-call votes into two groups: (more…)