Archive for the ‘Political Science’ Category

Updated to include two scatter plots

Having examined which states have the most and least libertarians, I’ve decided to do something similar for the 239 populated towns of New Hampshire. Towns are the most important level of local government here, and therefore the degree of libertarian-ness should make some difference to policy at the town level.

The indicators I use for number of libertarians are as follows: percentage of the vote for Gary Johnson and Ron Paul (write-ins) in the 2012 presidential general election (Ron Paul won a nontrivial number of write-ins in New Hampshire); percentage of the vote for libertarianish gubernatorial candidate Andrew Hemingway in the 2014 Republican primary (he got over 37% of the vote); percentage of the vote for Ron Paul in the 2012 Republican primary; percentage of the vote for Ron Paul in the 2008 Republican primary; and the percentage of voters registered “undeclared” (independent). These are all measured at the town level.

As in my research on the states, I use principal component analysis to reduce the correlations among these variables to a single “best” variable expressing their underlying commonality. I also “weight” the observations by population, since New Hampshire has many small towns, where sampling error should be higher (lots of zeroes and high percentages in election results). In fact, weighting the observations this way yields better results, as revealed by the eigenvalue of the first extracted component.

These variables do in fact correlate with each other and all contribute positively, as expected, to the extracted component. The highest scoring coefficient goes to 2012 Paul primary vote (0.55) and the lowest to undeclared registration percentage (0.25).

UPDATE: Here are two charts of Andrew Hemingway 2014 percentage against Ron Paul 2012 percentage, by town. The first limits to towns and cities with at least 700 population, the second to towns and cities with at least 10,000 population. As you can see, the correlation is strong.



And now for the lists of most and least libertarian towns…

Top 10:

Town Score
Richmond 11.2
Grafton 9.4
Wentworth 7.4
Alexandria 6.1
Lyman 6.0
Dorchester 5.7
Marlow 5.6
Clarksville 5.3
Croydon 5.2
Benton 5.1

Most of these are in Grafton County, where I also live. They are all small and rural. The most libertarian large town (over 5000 population) is Plymouth (score of 4.5), a left-leaning college town (also in Grafton Co.). The most libertarian-leaning municipality with a city form of government is Franklin in Merrimack County (score of 2.0). Almost all of the towns where libertarian candidates are most popular are in the west, especially northwest, of the state. Three exceptions are Francestown (5.0), Mason (4.3), Hill (4.0), and New Ipswich (3.9), but even these are west of I-93, which bisects most of the state. The top town east of I-93 is Pittsfield (3.2).

Here are the bottom 10:

Dixville -5.9
Hale's Location -4.7
New Castle -3.9
Rye -3.5
Jackson -3.2
Bedford -3.1
Waterville Valley -3.1
Atkinson -3.0
Stratham -3.0
New London -2.7

Four out of these 10 are in Rockingham County on the seacoast. Dixville and Hale’s Location are truly tiny. Bedford is a staunchly Republican suburb with a population over 20,000. In fact, many of the least libertarian places are well-to-do suburbs that are strongly establishment-Republican (Bedford, New London, Hooksett, Hampstead, Windham).

Examining the towns that are right in the middle of the spectrum will give us a sense of which places are most “representative” in their libertarian-ness. Here are those, filtering down to places with more than 1000 population:

Derry 0.2
Littleton 0.2
Goffstown 0.1
Keene 0.1
Manchester 0.1
Lee 0.0
Chester 0.0
Claremont -0.0
Sandown -0.2
New Boston -0.2

Some of these are not representative of the state in a left-right sense, however. New Boston, Goffstown, Littleton, and Chester are all firmly Republican, while Keene, Lee, and Claremont are if anything even more firmly Democratic. Derry (R-leaning), Manchester (D-leaning), and Sandown (R-leaning) could be considered somewhat representative of the state.

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A few years ago, I did a statistical analysis of which states had the most libertarians, using data from 2004 and 2008 Libertarian Party vote shares and 2008 Ron Paul vote shares and contributions. David Boaz has prodded me to update these numbers in light of the 2012 election. This post does just that.

To come up with a single, valid indicator of how many libertarians are in each state, I use a technique called principal component analysis (PCA), which extracts the vector of data that best explains the correlations among multiple variables. Say I have a number of different measures of the number of libertarians by state. Using PCA, I can convert those different measures into a single measure. A crude way of doing this would be to simply standardize and average all of the different variables, but that method assumes that each variable is an equally reliable measure of the underlying concept. PCA actually tells us which variables are most reliable measures and weights them more heavily.

To see which states have the most libertarians, I use six measures: Libertarian Party presidential vote share in 2008 and 2012, Ron Paul contributions as a share of personal income in 2007-8, Ron Paul and Gary Johnson contributions as a share of income in 2011-12, and “adjusted” Ron Paul primary vote share in 2008 and 2012. Ron Paul vote shares are adjusted for primary vs. caucus, calendar, number of other candidates, and the like (for details see this post). Hawaii and Wyoming are excluded because they did not collect vote shares in the 2008 presidential primary. D.C. is included.

Here are the results of the PCA on these six variables:

. pca resid12 resid08 lp12 lp08 rpcpi08 libcpi12

Principal components/correlation Number of obs = 49
Number of comp. = 6
Trace = 6
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho = 1.0000

Component | Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 | 2.81582 1.49201 0.4693 0.4693
Comp2 | 1.32382 .517957 0.2206 0.6899
Comp3 | .805859 .266932 0.1343 0.8242
Comp4 | .538928 .0754767 0.0898 0.9141
Comp5 | .463451 .411326 0.0772 0.9913
Comp6 | .0521252 . 0.0087 1.0000

Principal components (eigenvectors)

Variable | Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 | Unexplained
resid12 | 0.1159 0.7527 0.1699 0.3288 0.5308 -0.0354 | 0
resid08 | 0.3400 0.5441 0.1240 -0.3297 -0.6750 0.0934 | 0
lp12 | 0.4360 -0.1868 0.3962 -0.6239 0.4133 -0.2408 | 0
lp08 | 0.3628 -0.3001 0.6360 0.5552 -0.1895 0.1724 | 0
rpcpi08 | 0.5218 -0.0665 -0.4366 0.2925 -0.1052 -0.6604 | 0
libcpi12 | 0.5263 -0.0897 -0.4513 -0.0152 0.2117 0.6828 | 0

“Resid*” is adjusted Ron Paul vote share, “lp*” is LP vote share, and the last two variables are contributions as a share of personal income. What this output tells us is that one single component has lots of explanatory power for the correlations among these six variables: we can interpret this component as the number of libertarians in a state. The method doesn’t give us a number interpretable as an absolute count of libertarians, but a number that we can interpret as representing how many libertarians each state has compared to all the others.

The second table of output shows how each variable contributes to each component. To the first extracted component, the one of interest to us here, the contributions variables actually contribute the most, while adjusted Ron Paul vote shares, especially in 2012, contribute the least. I have found elsewhere that in 2012 Paul did really well in states with lots of liberal voters, as he expanded his base beyond libertarians to antiestablishment liberals and moderates. As a result, his cross-state performance in 2012 isn’t actually a good measure of how libertarian each state is. Still, it contributes a little something to our measure.

Here is the extracted component, with all the states ranked from most to least libertarian:

state libertarians
Montana 5.504036
New Hampshire 4.163368
Alaska 3.586032
New Mexico 3.319092
Idaho 2.842685
Nevada 2.477748
Texas 1.632528
Washington 1.568113
Oregon 1.180586
Arizona 1.0411
North Dakota 0.7316829
Indiana 0.6056806
California 0.5187439
Vermont 0.4731389
Utah 0.2056809
Colorado 0.1532149
Kansas 0.107657
South Dakota 0.0328709
Maine -0.0850015
Pennsylvania -0.2063729
Iowa -0.3226413
Georgia -0.3296589
Virginia -0.3893113
Maryland -0.4288172
Rhode Island -0.470931
Tennessee -0.4882021
Missouri -0.4912609
Arkansas -0.5384682
Louisiana -0.5897537
Nebraska -0.6350928
Minnesota -0.7662109
Michigan -0.7671053
North Carolina -0.811959
South Carolina -0.8196676
Illinois -0.9103957
Ohio -0.9599612
Delaware -1.057948
Florida -1.072601
District of Columbia -1.091851
New York -1.225912
Kentucky -1.330388
Massachusetts -1.342607
Wisconsin -1.410286
New Jersey -1.431843
Connecticut -1.606663
Alabama -1.863769
Oklahoma -1.93511
West Virginia -2.244921
Mississippi -2.519249

Mississippi and West Virginia have the fewest libertarians, while Montana and New Hampshire have the most. Note that Montana and New Mexico will be overstated on this measure, because I have added half of the Montana Constitution Party’s vote share to the Libertarian Party vote share in 2008, because they listed Ron Paul on their general election ballot. No other state had the opportunity to run Ron Paul in the general election, however, so this choice overstates how many libertarian voters are in Montana. But excluding Ron Paul from Montana’s vote share would hurt them because he presumably drew lots of votes away from Bob Barr, the LP candidate, in that state. If I do exclude Ron Paul’s votes entirely from Montana 2008, then New Hampshire ends up just pipping them for most libertarian state. New Mexico is overstated because it is Gary Johnson’s home state, who did very well there both on contributions and on vote share.

These results are quite similar to those I found back in 2010, perhaps unsurprisingly since I included 2008 data on both occasions. Still, there are some small differences. New Hampshire has now easily passed Alaska for the #2 spot. Vermont, Maine, Kentucky, and Texas have gained, while Michigan, Idaho, Indiana, and Georgia have fallen.

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Recently I finished reading the book Gaming the Vote by William Poundstone. I also assigned part of it to my Ethics & Economics Challenge students. It’s a fun and informative read, draping heavy-duty political science in engaging story-telling. (My post at e3ne.org on the topic is here.)

The book’s central thesis is that the American electoral system is irrational, and that range and approval voting methods provide obviously superior alternatives to the plurality rule for “single-winner” elections. Along the way, Poundstone discusses the Arrow Theorem and why it provides no obstacle to making a comparative judgment among voting rules.

Arrow’s impossibility theorem says that no social choice rule (method for coming up with a social preference ordering over possible alternatives) can satisfy the criteria of non-dictatorship (no one person can make the decision for the whole group, irrespective of the preferences of the rest), universal domain (no preference orderings are simply ruled out of order), Pareto optimality (if everyone prefers X to Y, so should the group), and independence of irrelevant alternatives (changing your relative ranking of X and Z shouldn’t affect your choice between X and Y). In simple language, the Arrow theorem says that there’s no such thing as a “will of the people”: only individuals have preferences.

Poundstone takes issue with that interpretation of the theorem, arguing that the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” criterion should be relaxed or removed. In essence, Poundstone believes that we can make interpersonal comparisons of utility (utility as cardinal, not just ordinal), and that once we do so, we can come up with some social choice rules that are objectively superior to others, because they result in more aggregate human welfare.

The assumption of cardinal, interpersonally comparable utility lies behind the case for range (or score) and approval voting as alternatives to plurality rule. The former methods are said to result in less “Bayesian regret” when used either sincerely or strategically. For instance, plurality voting leads to the “spoiler effect” (Nader causing Gore to lose to Bush) and lots of tactical voting (Nader supporters voting Kerry instead). Sometimes it can even result in victory for a candidate that would lose by a majority to every other candidate, or simply fails to choose the candidate that would beat every other candidate (Poundstone discusses how Stephen Douglas likely would have won a pairwise majority vote in 1860 rather than Abraham Lincoln).

From page 239 in the Poundstone book comes this graphic based on plausible simulations of different elections under various voting rules:

Bayesian regrets under alternative voting rules

Bayesian regrets under alternative voting rules

Lower scores here are better, and thus you can see that range voting leads to overall least “regret” when voters are sincere. When voters are 100% strategic, range and approval tie (fully strategic range voters simply cast strategic approval-like votes: full marks to their favorite and the preferred candidate of the two with the best chance of winning, none to the rest).

Of course, the whole exercise depends on the notion that you can sum up regrets across voters. In some parts of life, we make rough-and-ready interpersonal comparisons of utility. When we speak of those “less fortunate,” we clearly have in mind the idea that the poor are less happy than the rich. The possibility of empathy seems to require a view that others are “more or less similar” to ourselves, including in their capacity for happiness. At the same time, the possibility of individuality seems to require that we acknowledge that others are “in some ways quite dissimilar” to ourselves. I can’t know what’s best for you, because your happiness has a large idiosyncratic, unmeasurable component.

Where does that leave us? The Bayesian regret calculations, it seems to me, give us good reason to favor range and approval voting over the current system, simply because in the absence of any other numeraire for making cost-benefit calculations of policies, the assumption of interpersonal comparisons of happiness, with everyone capable of the same amount of happiness (no utility monsters), is better than the alternative of throwing up our hands. But we still can’t get away from the fundamental insights drawn from the Arrow theorem: that only individuals have preferences and act on them, and that trying to maximize social welfare at the expense of respect for individuality is not only possibly unjust, but also irrational.

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How does globalisation, especially foreign direct investment, influence the risk of intrastate conflict? While several prominent studies have found that globalisation reduces the probability of civil war, we use new data and methods to approach the question. In particular, we test for the possibility that foreign investment is endogenous to conflict risk and appropriately use inward foreign investment stock rather than net inflow to measure an economy’s exposure to international capital markets. We find no evidence that foreign investment affects civil conflict, suggesting that governments’ fundamental security interests trump the economic losses they can expect to suffer from failing to compromise with potential rebel groups.

New from Sorens & Ruger (full text to first 50 viewers).

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Bryan Caplan argues that social conservatives should prefer libertines to hypocrites, contrary to the common meme that “at least hypocrites have moral standards.” The argument is pretty simple: hypocrites seem to share your values, but when you least expect it, they will betray you. So far as it goes, the argument is pretty convincing.

But libertines and hypocrites aren’t the only two possible types of people who fail to live up to putative moral standards. A true hypocrite doesn’t actually have moral standards but merely pretends to them. After all, if one has moral standards, they should affect your behavior appreciably, but the hypocrite simply does what (s)he wants anyway while feigning belief in a stricter standard. That’s what makes hypocrites so dangerous.

The third type of moral failure is weakness of will. The weak-willed believe in moral standards and generally live up to them, but occasionally fail due to weakness of will. The weak of will acknowledge their flaws and try to do better, but you know they will sometimes fail. Unlike the hypocrite, the weak-willed is open about his/her failings, and therefore when dealing with them you know better what you’re dealing with. Unlike the libertine, the weak-willed often actually do live up to moral standards, so long as it isn’t too hard to do so.

Therefore, social conservatives should rank moral failures thus: 1) weakness of will, 2) libertinism, 3) hypocrisy. What some social conservatives praise when they praise “hypocrisy” is probably actually weakness of will, if they took some time to reflect on the distinctions.

I thought about these distinctions while considering the case of corrupt socialists. In the Spanish news today is the number-three man at Podemos, the extreme-left party in Spain (more or less their answer to Greece’s Syriza – the relations between the two parties are extremely close). This man, Juan Carlos Monedero, took half a million dollars from left-wing governments in Latin America (most particularly the Venezuelan dictatorship) for “consulting” and failed to pay taxes on it. He also defrauded his university, a technical college in Madrid, which was contractually guaranteed 20% of his consulting contracts.

Does this fraud evince hypocrisy or weakness of will? After all, Podemos has taken the lead in denouncing corruption in other parties, whom they call “la casta.” Withholding taxes from the government has to be a cardinal sin for socialists. Can true-believing socialists excuse the act on the grounds that “at least he has principles”? Or is he really pretending at having socialist principles at all?

It’s difficult to answer this question, because socialism attracts the unprincipled. If you want to enrich yourself through government, there’s no better way to do it than to denounce corruption and promote populist measures against the rich in order to get elected, and then once elected, use state-controlled companies to feather your own nest. When the state controls the economy, it controls wealth, and it will be extremely tempting to funnel some of that wealth to yourself and your friends.

Not knowing more about the man, it’s difficult to know whether Monedero – and quite possibly the other leaders of Podemos – are hypocrites or merely weak-willed. But that fact alone shows one of the inherent problems of socialism: really existing socialism either brings about rule by the already corrupt or corrupts those who rule.

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Last week Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice would be suspending its adoption of state civil forfeiture cases through its “Equitable Sharing” program. To review, civil asset forfeiture is the procedure by which law enforcement seizes property suspected of having been associated with a crime, and then auctions it off and uses the money for its own purposes. Under federal law, asset forfeiture is easy: the agency must simply show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was associated with a crime, and then the owner bears the burden of proving her innocence. Under the Equitable Sharing program, the Department of Justice “adopts” state cases in states in which forfeiture laws are stricter, thereby implicating the weaker federal standard, then shares up to 80% of the proceeds of these forfeitures with state and local law enforcement.

The system creates perverse incentives for seizing the cash, vehicles, and businesses of innocent people, as last year’s blockbuster investigation by the Washington Post revealed. Moreover, the Equitable Sharing program intentionally circumvents state law. The Institute for Justice’s 2010 study Policing for Profit showed that states with stricter civil asset forfeiture procedures saw substantially greater Equitable Sharing revenues.

Thus, Holder’s announcement is very welcome. Still, as Radley Balko points out, the new policy contains some big exceptions:

. . . (1) seizures by state and local authorities working together with federal authorities in a joint task force; (2) seizures by state and local authorities that are the result of joint federal-state investigations or that are coordinated with federal authorities as part of ongoing federal investigations; or (3) seizures pursuant to federal seizure warrants, obtained from federal courts to take custody of assets originally seized under state law.

According to the WaPo story, only 57% of Equitable Sharing proceeds came from state-only investigations, so the new policy should cut payments to state and local agencies by about half. When it comes to big forfeitures, the new policy creates an obvious incentive for local law enforcement to bring in a federal investigator to create a pretext for adoption. Moreover, many of those forfeitures that are no longer adopted will still be pursued under state law, simply with a higher evidentiary threshold in many cases. Thus, the total amount of civil forfeiture that occurs in this country can be expected to drop by only a small fraction of the current annual average total.

To get a better sense of how this policy change will affect asset forfeiture in the states, I will present some numbers from the new asset forfeiture dataset that we are compiling for the fourth edition of Freedom in the 50 States. We have data on Equitable Sharing proceeds by state from Fiscal Year 2000-01 to Fiscal Year 2012-13, as well as detailed information on state standards for forfeiture.

The following time-series chart shows Equitable Sharing revenues per $1000 of state personal income for several large states: Texas, Florida, California, Illinois, and New York. These data exclude a massive, one-time payout to New York agencies for the Bernie Madoff case.
equitable sharing by state
As the chart shows, Equitable Sharing really began to ramp up in 2006-07. By 2012-13, these five states combined for $228 million in forfeiture revenues from the federal government. For each of the last four years, California was first or second among these five states in forfeiture revenue as a share of the state economy. Probably not coincidentally, California has some of the toughest procedures for civil forfeiture in the country.

In the U.S. as a whole, Equitable Sharing forfeiture revenues totaled $486 million in FY 2012-13, more than double the total of 2004-05. We don’t know just what the total value of assets forfeited in the country is, because states and localities don’t often keep track of the data. Moreover, the Equitable Sharing program includes proceeds of criminal as well as civil forfeiture (criminal forfeiture upon conviction is much less controversial). But from the states for which we do have data, it appears that, at least in the early 2000s, total assets forfeited through state law amounted to about 20-50% more than what the states got from Equitable Sharing. Those figures undercount the losses to victims of forfeiture, because agencies get, at best, market value for what they seize. So it’s quite possible that each year, more than $1 billion in value is taken from property owners through civil asset forfeiture.

Now that the Equitable Sharing program is being curtailed, state laws will matter more. Which states are best positioned to protect property rights in the new order? Here’s a ranking of states as of January 1, 2015 on citizen protections from civil asset forfeiture, based on the burden of proof for showing that the property was connected to a crime, whether there is an “innocent owner” rebuttable presumption, where the proceeds of asset forfeiture go (when they go to the forfeiting agency, there are more incentives for abuse), and whether the state had put any limits on Equitable Sharing already:

1. North Carolina
2. California
3. Colorado
4. New Mexico
5. Florida
5. Minnesota
7. Oregon
8. Vermont
8. Missouri
10. Nebraska
10. Wisconsin
10. Indiana
10. Maine
14. Kansas
14. Michigan
14. Maryland
17. Connecticut
18. Utah
19. New York
19. Kentucky
21. Louisiana
21. Mississippi
21. Nevada
24. New Hampshire
24. Texas
26. Alabama
27. Arizona
27. Arkansas
27. Hawaii
27. Idaho
27. Iowa
27. New Jersey
27. Ohio
27. Oklahoma
27. Pennsylvania
27. Tennessee
27. Virginia
27. West Virginia
39. Illinois
39. Rhode Island
39. South Carolina
42. Georgia
42. North Dakota
42. South Dakota
42. Washington
46. Alaska
46. Delaware
46. Massachusetts
46. Montana
46. Wyoming

With any luck, Holder’s decision will inaugurate a new round of forfeiture reforms at the state level, as legislators realize that they once again have the power to set policy for their own officials.

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Dragnet’s Joe Friday may have never uttered those words, but he would be impressed nonetheless by the facts on crime. There was a fascinating piece by Erik Eckholm in yesterday’s New York Times on the Drop-in-crimedramatic reductions in crime over the past several decades. Overall, crime peaked in 1991 and has fallen steadily since then.


All of this leads to the big question: why? Is it a change in tactics (e.g., aggressive policing, the “broken window” theory)? Is it a product of an increase in the costs of criminality (e.g., mandatory sentencing and the decision to keep 1.5 million people in prison)? Is it a product of good economic times? Perhaps it simply reflects demographics (e.g., the aging of the population, the decline in teenage pregnancy)? In the end, law professor Franklin E. Zimring (UC-Berkeley) is quoted as describing the search for an explanation as “criminological astrology.”


Max Ehrenfreund (Washington Post Wonkblog) has designated the above “chart of the day” as “something of a Rorschach test. Everyone sees what they want to see in it.” That may be something of an overstatement. Certainly, the advocates of the war on drugs, police militarization, aggressive policing and harsh sentencing laws will view it as evidence that their strategies have worked. They will have the challenge of explaining why similar trends are evident elsewhere, including Canada, that have not embraced the US model. And I am not at all certain of how the Left would make sense of the fact that crime has fallen as inequality has increased.

Will the decline in crime have an impact on public policy? Will it lead to a rethinking of police militarization and mass incarceration? I hold little hope given that public opinion seems immune to the facts.



Even if crime has fallen dramatically, according to Gallup the majority of Americans in most years on record believe that crime is getting worse. As Gallup observes: “federal crime statistics have not been highly relevant to the public’s crime perceptions in recent years.” A public concerned with crime and (willfully) ignorant of the long-term trends will continue to demand an aggressive police presence. And that demand will be met.

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