Posts Tagged ‘war’

Did the emergence of the state reduce the rate of human death from warfare? Steven Pinker’s outstanding book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, surveys many reasons why you are less likely to die from violence today than your ancestors were. Part of his explanation is that warfare was constant in stateless, anarchic societies, but the emergence of the state, beginning about six thousand years ago, helped reduce this problem. He has nice things to say about Thomas Hobbes’ thesis in Leviathan, that a powerful government is necessary to rescue people from their natural state of constant warfare.

In my most recent Learn Liberty blog post, I question this finding of Pinker’s. I argue that the evidence he presents for the claim does not suffice to prove it, because there are other factors that could explain declining rates of war death. Moreover, even if the state reduced war death somewhat, we can’t necessarily infer from that fact alone that the state increased human welfare. From the post:

[T]here is an important conceptual problem for the claim that the rise of the state improved human welfare by reducing violent deaths.

After all, early states arose almost exclusively out of conquest, as Pinker concedes. They started as roving bands of armed robbers, who eventually found that converting robbery into regularized taxation would destroy less wealth and generate more revenue over the long run. Autonomous peoples do not go into “subject” status willingly.

More at the link.

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Today Vladimir Putin signed a treaty with the self-styled independent government of Crimea, annexing Crimea to Russia. I did not see this coming. It is an unprecedented deviation from the post-World War 2 international norm that force and the threat of force shall not be used for conquest. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” When Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait to Iraq, the UN Security Council swiftly and unanimously approved sanctions, and when Hussein did not withdraw, authorized the use of force to expel his forces. Other de facto annexations have happened — Russia has occupied Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, and Armenia has occupied Nagorno-Karabakh — but in none of these cases has annexation been formalized. There have been other conflicts over disputed territory — China-India, Somalia-Ethiopia, and Britain-Argentina, for instance — but in all these cases there was a legitimate dispute over proper ownership of the territories involved. By contrast, Russia had previously guaranteed to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, in exchange for obtaining the latter’s nuclear weapons. Finally, all secessions between 1945 and 2007 were widely recognized only with the consent (however begrudging) of the rump state. Kosovo’s independence was an important — some would say “dangerous” — deviation from this pattern in 2008.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea therefore sets a dangerous new precedent. It threatens to return the world to an environment in which the “strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must,” with adverse repercussions not just for Russia and Ukraine, but for the whole world. Russia under Putin bids fair to become a pariah state.

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Gazeta.pl reports that the majority of the Crimean parliament did not vote in favor of a referendum on independence, but that armed men prevented a quorum from attending, allowing a pro-Russian rump to pass the measure. (For my translation, I am relying on Jacek Rostowski on Twitter.) In eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian crowds face determined Ukrainian nationalist, pro-Maidan forces.

Russia’s military occupation of Crimea should not be taken as evidence of autochthonous secessionism. Instead, Russia seems to be using a minority of secessionist diehards to serve as an excuse for, possibly, annexing Crimea de facto to Russia, in more or less the same way as it did with Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. The main differences between that episode and this one are that Abkhazia and South Ossetia had already established de facto independence, and Georgia initiated the conflict with Russia. Thus, Russia’s intervention in Crimea is a riskier gamble. It may indicate, however, just how threatened Russia feels by a future in which Ukraine joins the EU and perhaps even NATO.

Update: TAC’s Dan McCarthy plausibly argues that Russia would prefer to use its military control over Crimea as a bargaining chip to ensure a subservient Ukraine.

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Is there any war (or OOTW) that the United States has fought that it should not have (assuming what was known at the time of the force initiation, not post hoc)? 

What wars/OOTW’s should the United States have participated in/undertaken that it did not?


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Not long after the ratification of the Constitution, Madison came to have serious doubts about his former Federalist friends. Particularly, he came to suspect the sincerity of many who had asserted that the new government would possess only those powers specifically delegated to it.

The first disappointment came with Hamilton’s championing of the incorporation of the Bank of the United States in 1791. It sparked the formation of the first party system: Federalists who supported the bank versus Republicans (not the modern party by that name) who opposed it. Madison felt especially sensitive to this issue. He remembered that the power of incorporation had come up at the Philadelphia convention. Indeed, he remembered it so well because he had been the one to move for its approval. He also recalled that it had been roundly voted down.

To Madison’s thinking, the power to incorporate was a very particular and peculiar power. At the time he had proposed its inclusion in the Constitution, he was certain it could serve important national purposes, but having been voted down, he was just as certain that no such power had been given to the general government.

Hamilton took a different view. The bank, he argued, would be of such significant utility to the collection of taxes, the paying of obligations, the administration of finance, both public and private, and of the regulation of commerce and the value of coinage, that it achieved the level of an implied power. Its necessity was established by its usefulness, and as such, it was constitutional.

To Madison that way of thinking amounted to no limits at all. By such an assumption, anything deemed useful could be done by the federal government regardless of whether or not it had been specifically written down. Where then was the promise of reserved and delegated powers?

Madison summarized his concern poignantly on the floor of the House: “With all this evidence of the sense in which the con (more…)

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Apropos of North Korea’s bluster, the following from Kenneth Waltz – the arch realist – in his co-authored book The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate:

Deterrent strategies lower the probability that wars will begin.  If wars start nevertheless, deterrent strategies lower the probability that they will be carried very far.  Nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of war among their possessors.  For fear of escalation, nuclear states do not want to fight long and hard over important interests – indeed, they do not want to fight at all.  Minor nuclear states have even better reasons than major ones to accommodate one another and avoid fighting wars.  Worries about the intensity of war among nuclear states have to be viewed in this context and against a world in which conventional weapons have become even costlier and more destructive.  (page 37)

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From a recent interview with Andrew Bacevich:

When it comes to foreign and defense policy, authentic conservatives are wary of utopian schemes, sensitive to the need to husband power, and have an aversion to war. That tends to make them anti-interventionists and to favor the use of force only as a last resort.

Ditto for libertarians.  I have a hard time understanding libertarian imperialism.   Libertarians, in particular those influenced by British classical liberals, are generally wary of utopian schemes (especially when government is the driver) and appreciate the importance of unintended consequences (ending up harming those we are trying to help, “blowback” in foreign policy, and the rise in the power of the state that correlates with war being three of them).  They are also suspicious of social change at the point of a gun.  So why aren’t these elements of the libertarian mindset that are continually applied to domestic government intervention also applied to foreign intervention?     

HT: Dan McCarthy

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