Posts Tagged ‘ron paul’

A few years ago, I did a statistical analysis of which states had the most libertarians, using data from 2004 and 2008 Libertarian Party vote shares and 2008 Ron Paul vote shares and contributions. David Boaz has prodded me to update these numbers in light of the 2012 election. This post does just that.

To come up with a single, valid indicator of how many libertarians are in each state, I use a technique called principal component analysis (PCA), which extracts the vector of data that best explains the correlations among multiple variables. Say I have a number of different measures of the number of libertarians by state. Using PCA, I can convert those different measures into a single measure. A crude way of doing this would be to simply standardize and average all of the different variables, but that method assumes that each variable is an equally reliable measure of the underlying concept. PCA actually tells us which variables are most reliable measures and weights them more heavily.

To see which states have the most libertarians, I use six measures: Libertarian Party presidential vote share in 2008 and 2012, Ron Paul contributions as a share of personal income in 2007-8, Ron Paul and Gary Johnson contributions as a share of income in 2011-12, and “adjusted” Ron Paul primary vote share in 2008 and 2012. Ron Paul vote shares are adjusted for primary vs. caucus, calendar, number of other candidates, and the like (for details see this post). Hawaii and Wyoming are excluded because they did not collect vote shares in the 2008 presidential primary. D.C. is included.

Here are the results of the PCA on these six variables:

. pca resid12 resid08 lp12 lp08 rpcpi08 libcpi12

Principal components/correlation Number of obs = 49
Number of comp. = 6
Trace = 6
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho = 1.0000

Component | Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 | 2.81582 1.49201 0.4693 0.4693
Comp2 | 1.32382 .517957 0.2206 0.6899
Comp3 | .805859 .266932 0.1343 0.8242
Comp4 | .538928 .0754767 0.0898 0.9141
Comp5 | .463451 .411326 0.0772 0.9913
Comp6 | .0521252 . 0.0087 1.0000

Principal components (eigenvectors)

Variable | Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 | Unexplained
resid12 | 0.1159 0.7527 0.1699 0.3288 0.5308 -0.0354 | 0
resid08 | 0.3400 0.5441 0.1240 -0.3297 -0.6750 0.0934 | 0
lp12 | 0.4360 -0.1868 0.3962 -0.6239 0.4133 -0.2408 | 0
lp08 | 0.3628 -0.3001 0.6360 0.5552 -0.1895 0.1724 | 0
rpcpi08 | 0.5218 -0.0665 -0.4366 0.2925 -0.1052 -0.6604 | 0
libcpi12 | 0.5263 -0.0897 -0.4513 -0.0152 0.2117 0.6828 | 0

“Resid*” is adjusted Ron Paul vote share, “lp*” is LP vote share, and the last two variables are contributions as a share of personal income. What this output tells us is that one single component has lots of explanatory power for the correlations among these six variables: we can interpret this component as the number of libertarians in a state. The method doesn’t give us a number interpretable as an absolute count of libertarians, but a number that we can interpret as representing how many libertarians each state has compared to all the others.

The second table of output shows how each variable contributes to each component. To the first extracted component, the one of interest to us here, the contributions variables actually contribute the most, while adjusted Ron Paul vote shares, especially in 2012, contribute the least. I have found elsewhere that in 2012 Paul did really well in states with lots of liberal voters, as he expanded his base beyond libertarians to antiestablishment liberals and moderates. As a result, his cross-state performance in 2012 isn’t actually a good measure of how libertarian each state is. Still, it contributes a little something to our measure.

Here is the extracted component, with all the states ranked from most to least libertarian:

state libertarians
Montana 5.504036
New Hampshire 4.163368
Alaska 3.586032
New Mexico 3.319092
Idaho 2.842685
Nevada 2.477748
Texas 1.632528
Washington 1.568113
Oregon 1.180586
Arizona 1.0411
North Dakota 0.7316829
Indiana 0.6056806
California 0.5187439
Vermont 0.4731389
Utah 0.2056809
Colorado 0.1532149
Kansas 0.107657
South Dakota 0.0328709
Maine -0.0850015
Pennsylvania -0.2063729
Iowa -0.3226413
Georgia -0.3296589
Virginia -0.3893113
Maryland -0.4288172
Rhode Island -0.470931
Tennessee -0.4882021
Missouri -0.4912609
Arkansas -0.5384682
Louisiana -0.5897537
Nebraska -0.6350928
Minnesota -0.7662109
Michigan -0.7671053
North Carolina -0.811959
South Carolina -0.8196676
Illinois -0.9103957
Ohio -0.9599612
Delaware -1.057948
Florida -1.072601
District of Columbia -1.091851
New York -1.225912
Kentucky -1.330388
Massachusetts -1.342607
Wisconsin -1.410286
New Jersey -1.431843
Connecticut -1.606663
Alabama -1.863769
Oklahoma -1.93511
West Virginia -2.244921
Mississippi -2.519249

Mississippi and West Virginia have the fewest libertarians, while Montana and New Hampshire have the most. Note that Montana and New Mexico will be overstated on this measure, because I have added half of the Montana Constitution Party’s vote share to the Libertarian Party vote share in 2008, because they listed Ron Paul on their general election ballot. No other state had the opportunity to run Ron Paul in the general election, however, so this choice overstates how many libertarian voters are in Montana. But excluding Ron Paul from Montana’s vote share would hurt them because he presumably drew lots of votes away from Bob Barr, the LP candidate, in that state. If I do exclude Ron Paul’s votes entirely from Montana 2008, then New Hampshire ends up just pipping them for most libertarian state. New Mexico is overstated because it is Gary Johnson’s home state, who did very well there both on contributions and on vote share.

These results are quite similar to those I found back in 2010, perhaps unsurprisingly since I included 2008 data on both occasions. Still, there are some small differences. New Hampshire has now easily passed Alaska for the #2 spot. Vermont, Maine, Kentucky, and Texas have gained, while Michigan, Idaho, Indiana, and Georgia have fallen.

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Edit: The source for the donations data is opensecrets.org; the source for the personal income data is the BEA.

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Per commenter FreeDem’s request, here are some other ways to interpret Ron Paul’s primary performances in each state, building on the statistical models estimated here.

The first exercise is to simulate what Paul’s percentage of the vote would have been in each state had they all voted at the same time with the same “institutions” (candidates on the ballot, primary vs. caucus, closed vs. open, and so on). For this exercise, I assumed that all calendar and institutional characteristics were at the median for the nation as a whole. Thus, I assume a primary not a caucus, a closed primary rather than an open or semi-open one, three other candidates on the ballot, a ballot date after Mitt Romney had built substantial momentum with his Michigan victory on Feb. 28 — but before his virtual mathematical clinching on Apr. 2, and no home state advantage for any candidate.

Under these conditions, Paul would have obtained 13.9% of the vote in the average state. Here is how he would be forecast to do in each state, in alphabetical order:

State pred12
Alabama 7.39%
Alaska 15.37%
Arizona 8.70%
Arkansas 13.77%
California 12.17%
Colorado 10.81%
Connecticut 15.94%
Delaware 12.48%
District of Columbia 12.17%
Florida 10.14%
Georgia 12.20%
Hawaii 12.30%
Idaho 11.53%
Illinois 9.68%
Indiana 15.93%
Iowa 19.70%
Kansas 13.73%
Kentucky 14.82%
Louisiana 10.51%
Maine 19.48%
Maryland 13.58%
Massachusetts 17.73%
Michigan 16.80%
Minnesota 12.71%
Mississippi 6.53%
Missouri 12.76%
Montana 14.80%
Nebraska 11.26%
Nevada 10.09%
New Hampshire 31.74%
New Jersey 11.75%
New Mexico 12.29%
New York 17.28%
North Carolina 12.63%
North Dakota 15.54%
Ohio 12.80%
Oklahoma 16.45%
Oregon 15.12%
Pennsylvania 26.43%
Rhode Island 27.08%
South Carolina 16.29%
South Dakota 15.40%
Tennessee 13.42%
Texas 15.57%
Utah 5.39%
Vermont 31.41%
Virginia 24.61%
Washington 15.81%
West Virginia 12.54%
Wisconsin 13.85%
Wyoming 13.27%

The rank order of states here is of course exactly the same as in the table of residuals from my earlier post, but the presentation of the numbers is perhaps more intuitive.

The next analysis looks at why Paul improved from 2008 so much in some states and little if any in others. In my last post I found that Paul’s electoral performance in 2012 is predicted by state opinion ideology, with more left-wing states giving more support to Paul. However, 2008 LP support is not at all correlated with Paul support in 2012. I inferred that Paul received a great deal of support from voters who would otherwise go Democratic and from liberal Republicans and independents, particularly since the association between ideology and Paul support strengthened conditional on an open primary.

However, I did not control for how “pro-Ron Paul” a state was in 2008. FreeDem reports seeing some odd state-level differences between Paul’s 2008 success and 2012 success when eyeballing the data. Using my analysis of the 2008 returns, I now try formally testing whether Ron Paul’s support in 2008 was correlated with his support in 2012. I regress the log of Paul support in 2012 on the institutional variables, Democratic-Green vote share in 2008, and the log of institution-corrected Paul vote share in 2008. Here are the results:

. regress lnrp caucus12 open12 closed12 ocb clinch home demgr08 lnrp08

Number of obs =      49
F(  8,    40) =    9.67
Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.6592
Adj R-squared =  0.5911
Root MSE      =  .31484

        lnrp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
    caucus12 |   .5744784   .1465334     3.92   0.000     .2783233    .8706335
      open12 |   .0946405   .1444686     0.66   0.516    -.1973414    .3866224
    closed12 |  -.1744016   .1367005    -1.28   0.209    -.4506836    .1018805
         ocb |  -.1192173   .0418184    -2.85   0.007    -.2037355   -.0346991
      clinch |  -.1881422   .1700441    -1.11   0.275    -.5318141    .1555297
        home |   .0832717   .2090593     0.40   0.693     -.339253    .5057963
     demgr08 |   .0091053    .004799     1.90   0.065    -.0005938    .0188044
      lnrp08 |   .4681954   .1376803     3.40   0.002     .1899331    .7464578
       _cons |  -.5945686   .6079726    -0.98   0.334    -1.823327    .6341899

Now I do find evidence that Paul’s support in 2012 depended on the strength of the Paul constituency in 2008, controlling for everything else. Although the statistical significance is strong, the substantive import is in a sense strikingly low. Since the dependent and independent variable are both in logs, we can interpret the coefficient on Ron Paul support in ’08 — 0.468 — as an elasticity. In other words, for every 1% more votes Paul got in 2008, he got just 0.5% more votes in 2012. That tells us that while Ron Paul’s base turned out again for him in 2012, his additional success was probably not related to picking up a bunch of semi-libertarian marginal voters who might have gone with him had his campaign been stronger in 2008. Instead, he reached a whole new constituency. Paul more than doubled his vote share between 2008 and 2012. That mostly did not come from mobilizing more libertarians. He got the libertarians to vote for him again, but most of his new votes came from people we would not normally think of as libertarians.

Who exactly were these new Paul voters? We can find out more, I think, by looking at individual states where Paul improved or did not improve between elections. Here are some states where Paul did badly in both years (adjusted vote shares from 2008 and 2012 in parentheses): Alabama (2.9%/7.4%), Utah (3.0%/5.4%), Mississippi (1.9%/6.5%), Arizona (4.4%/8.7%), and Illinois (5.4%/9.7%). These are states without many libertarians and also without many social and foreign policy moderates and liberals. We could throw in West Virginia (2.9%/12.5%), Florida (3.8%/10.1%), New Jersey (4.9%/11.8%), Delaware (4.2%/12.5%), and California (6.3%/12.2%) as also being of this type.

Then we have states like Idaho (10.8%/11.5%), D.C. (7.8%/12.2%), Montana (7.8%/14.8%), North Dakota (7.1%/15.5%), South Dakota (8.6%/15.4%), and Washington (8.2%/15.8%), where Paul did well in 2008 but did not improve much in 2012. He seemed to hit a ceiling in places like these. My hypothesis is that these states have a lot of libertarians but not many social and foreign policy moderates who are willing to take a Republican ballot. In all the states I just mentioned except perhaps D.C., social conservatives tend to dominate the state Republican party. Washington may be a partial exception, but only a partial one. Washington certainly does not have the tradition of moderate Republicanism that, say, Massachusetts and Connecticut do.

Then there are states where Paul underperformed in 2008 and then improved significantly in 2012: Connecticut (4%/15.9%), Indiana (4%/15.9%), Iowa (3.8%/19.7%), Kentucky (3.8%/14.8%), Massachusetts (3%/17.7%), Oklahoma (4%/16.5%), Rhode Island (6.1%/27.1%), South Carolina (4.3%/16.3%), and Vermont (6.4%/31.4%). New York (6.7%/17.3%) is a state where Paul went from slightly above average to well above. What at least some of these states have in common is a lot of former Republicans and independents who are moderate to liberal on social and foreign policy issues. (I can’t explain Oklahoma, but South Carolina’s improvement might have to do something with a bounce from New Hampshire, and Kentucky with Rand Paul’s prominence.) In Vermont, especially, I will bet my bottom dollar that most Ron Paul voters were centrists or even progressives ticked off at wars, banker bailouts, and civil liberty infringements, but not necessarily signing onto Paul’s whole economic program. His outstanding improvement there may also have something to do with spillover from New Hampshire.

Finally, there are only a few states where Paul did very well in both years: Maine (6.9%/19.5%), Michigan (7.2%/16.8%), New Hampshire (11.2%/31.7%), and Pennsylvania (7.8%/26.4%). These seem like states with both quite a few libertarians and lots of moderates and progressives willing to take a Republican ballot. While economic insecurity might be another hypothesis for the increase in Paul support, that wouldn’t explain why Paul did so poorly in Nevada (10.1% adjusted), New Jersey (11.8% adjusted), or Georgia (12.2% adjusted), all of which have suffered more than the national average from the bursting of the housing bubble.

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After the 2008 primary season, I analyzed Ron Paul’s performance in each state to see how institutional factors such as caucus and primary form affected his electoral success. This exercise turned out to be useful for estimating the size of the pro-liberty electorate in each state. In this post, I do the same with the 2012 results.

The dependent variable in this analysis is the percentage of the vote obtained in each state’s statewide primary or caucus. If a state held both a primary and a caucus or convention, I used the primary results. The independent variables are as follows. (All variables were taken from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.)

First, I use a dummy variable for whether the state had a caucus or convention versus a primary. As an outsider candidate with a committed band of activist supporters, Paul tended to do much better in caucuses than primaries.

Next, I also included dummy variables for who is eligible to vote: a dummy for an open caucus/primary, in which all voters are allowed to vote, and a dummy for a closed caucus/primary, in which only registered Republicans are allowed to vote. The excluded category consists of “modified-open” elections, in which independents and Republicans are allowed to vote. Since Paul was more popular among self-identified independents than among self-identified Republicans, it stands to reason that he would do best in open primaries and worst in closed primaries.

I also tried variables for the number of other candidates running active races and appearing on the ballot. In this regard, I counted only “significant” candidates that might have had a chance of winning, that is, the following six (other than Paul): Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum, Newt Gingrich, Rick Perry, Jon Huntsman, and Michele Bachmann. Bachmann dropped out of the race after Iowa and Perry and Huntsman after New Hampshire. Thereafter, Santorum withdrew only after the April 10 primaries and Gingrich held on until May 2. However, in many states – almost entirely primary states – candidates that had withdrawn remained on the ballot and often received significant support. We should expect both of these variables to have a negative influence on Paul’s vote share (for instance, in Virginia, where only Romney and Paul were on the ballot, Paul benefited from tactical voting by supporters of other candidates and received 40%), but in fact the number of candidates in the race had a statistically significant, positive association with Paul’s support (candidates on the ballot has the expected negative association, as shown below). This result is theoretically implausible and apparently simply captures Paul’s otherwise unexplained success in Iowa and New Hampshire. Therefore, in the estimations reported here, I have included solely the variable for number of non-Paul candidates on the ballot.

Next, I included a three-point variable for the extent to which Mitt Romney had clinched the Republican nomination when the primary in question was held. After February 28, it became very unlikely that Romney would lose, as Nate Silver noted here. After April 3, it became a near mathematical certainty that Romney would win. Therefore, the “clinching” variable takes on values of 0.5 for contests held after February 28 through April 3 and values of 1.0 for contests held after April 3.

Finally, I include a variable intended to capture home-state effects for active candidates. It is coded zero for all states except Massachusetts, Georgia, and Texas. For the former two, home states of Romney and Gingrich, respectively, it is coded -1, and for the last, Paul’s home state, it is coded 1. (Santorum dropped out of the race before the Pennsylvania vote, for which reason it is coded zero.)

The dependent variable is rather skewed, as the following histogram shows:

As a result, statistical analysis with this variable revealed the presence of heteroskedasticity, which violates the assumptions necessary for Ordinary Least Squares regression. Therefore, I transformed the variable using the natural log, which gave it a roughly normal distribution and eliminated heteroskedasticity in the regression analysis:

The results of the regression analysis are reported below the fold:

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My original forecasts for Ron Paul’s primary performances are here. Those forecasts were based simply on the Iowa result, so it was quite possible that there would substantial error, and indeed there has been. Paul significantly overperformed his forecast in New Hampshire and South Carolina, the forecast was dead on in Florida, and then Paul underperformed significantly in Nevada. In yesterday’s elections, Paul did significantly worse than expected in Colorado, slightly worse than expected in Minnesota, and slightly better than expected in Missouri. In general, he seems to be doing worse than expected since Florida.

Why is that? It could be that my forecast model was an unbiased model at the time, but that circumstances have changed unfavorably for Paul’s candidacy. Certainly, recent good economic news probably doesn’t help an antiestablishment candidate like Paul. Perhaps his poor Florida performance, although it should have been anticipated, demoralized some of his supporters. On the other hand, my forecast model could have been wrong, particularly in assuming that Paul’s vote shares would continue to feature overdispersion. It’s possible that with a broadening voter base, Paul’s caucus advantage has declined. Thus, Paul should improve on his 2008 performances everywhere, but not in a manner proportionate to his 2008 performances: there will be some apparent regression to the mean.

To see how Paul’s 2012 performances are stacking up against his 2008 performances, I ran a regression on the states with results so far. First, I regressed 2012 performance against 2008 performance linearly. Here are the results:

lm(formula = vote12 ~ vote08)

    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-5.0465 -3.8563  0.8463  2.0316  6.8799 

            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept)   6.9290     3.4156   2.029   0.0888 .
vote08        1.1807     0.3632   3.251   0.0175 *
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 

Residual standard error: 4.444 on 6 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.6378,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.5775 
F-statistic: 10.57 on 1 and 6 DF,  p-value: 0.01745

These results suggest that for every 1% in 2008 vote share in a state, Paul is now receiving 1.2% in 2012, in addition to a base of 6.9% everywhere – so getting 5% in a 2008 primary would be associated with a forecast of about 12.9% in 2012. With these eight data points, the simple model explains 63.8% of the variance in 2012 performance.

Next, I turn to a log-linear model, which would be more appropriate if Paul’s performances continue to experience overdispersion. Here are the results:

lm(formula = lnvote12 ~ lnvote08)

     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max 
-0.36483 -0.22250  0.06901  0.15519  0.35117 

            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)   1.5376     0.3628   4.238  0.00545 **
lnvote08      0.6086     0.1768   3.442  0.01377 * 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 

Residual standard error: 0.2805 on 6 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.6638,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.6078 
F-statistic: 11.85 on 1 and 6 DF,  p-value: 0.01377

Although the coefficient estimate is not so easily interpreted, this model actually does a slightly better job than the simple linear model. (I also test various transformations of the independent variable to get at other nonlinearities, but none of those models improves significantly over this one.) So I use these estimates to get new forecasts of the remaining contests. Here they are:

State Date Forecast
Maine 11-Feb 27.2%
Arizona 28-Feb 11.3%
Michigan 28-Feb 14.2%
Washington 3-Mar 15.8%
Alaska 6-Mar 26.4%
Georgia 6-Mar 8.9%
Idaho 6-Mar 32.0%
Massachusetts 6-Mar 8.4%
North Dakota 6-Mar 29.9%
Ohio 6-Mar 12.2%
Oklahoma 6-Mar 9.7%
Tennessee 6-Mar 13.3%
Vermont 6-Mar 15.4%
Virginia 6-Mar 11.6%
Kansas 10-Mar 20.2%
Alabama 13-Mar 8.6%
Mississippi 13-Mar 10.9%
Illinois 20-Mar 12.5%
Louisiana 24-Mar 13.1%
District of Columbia 3-Apr 16.6%
Maryland 3-Apr 13.8%
Wisconsin 3-Apr 12.0%
Texas 3-Apr 12.5%
Connecticut 24-Apr 10.9%
Delaware 24-Apr 11.2%
New York 24-Apr 14.4%
Pennsylvania 24-Apr 25.1%
Rhode Island 24-Apr 15.1%
Indiana 8-May 16.1%
North Carolina 8-May 15.5%
West Virginia 8-May 12.4%
Nebraska 15-May 22.2%
Oregon 15-May 23.8%
Arkansas 22-May 12.1%
Kentucky 22-May 14.9%
California 5-Jun 12.9%
Montana 5-Jun 17.6%
New Jersey 5-Jun 12.1%
New Mexico 5-Jun 23.2%
South Dakota 5-Jun 25.7%
Utah 26-Jun 8.9%

In general, these new forecasts are lower for Paul in his best states and higher in his worst states. (So yes, his support is less overdispersed this time around, suggesting that his new support is less enthusiastic than his core support – not really surprising.) With the new forecasts, it’s looking unlikely that Paul will win any states outright, although Idaho, North Dakota, and Maine present possibilities.

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That’s right; in addition to the 23% of the Republican vote he took, Paul took 4% of the Democratic vote as a write-in candidate, good for second place, according to the NH Secretary of State. (Note: the NH SOS website is down right now, so I’m relying on descriptions of what it says given to me by my colleagues in New Hampshire.)

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Last night, Ron Paul increased his percentage of the Iowa caucus vote from 10.0% in 2008 to 21.4%. If we can expect this same kind of increase from Paul in the remaining states, what would we expect his performance to be? I have found that Ron Paul’s primary vote shares are best modeled logarithmically, due to overdispersion in the data. Put another way, Paul increased his vote share from 2.3 log points to 3.1 log points last night, an increase of 0.765 log points. What if Paul experienced that same gain in the remaining states in the primary calendar?

I’m going to do something pretty simple here. I’m going to add that figure to Paul’s 2008 performances for each state and then convert back into percentages. However, Montana has switched from a caucus to a primary, which should hurt Paul, so for Montana I’ve subtracted from Paul’s score the estimated benefit he received from caucus states in 2008. I’ve arranged the list according to each state’s place in this year’s calendar.

State Date Forecast
New Hampshire 10-Jan 16.4%
South Carolina 21-Jan 7.8%
Florida 31-Jan 6.9%
Nevada 4-Feb 29.5%
Colorado 7-Feb 17.8%
Minnesota 7-Feb 33.7%
Missouri 7-Feb 9.6%
Maine 11-Feb 39.2%
Arizona 28-Feb 9.3%
Michigan 28-Feb 13.5%
Washington 3-Mar 46.4%
Alaska 6-Mar 37.3%
Georgia 6-Mar 6.3%
Idaho 6-Mar 51.0%
Massachusetts 6-Mar 5.7%
North Dakota 6-Mar 45.7%
Ohio 6-Mar 10.4%
Oklahoma 6-Mar 7.2%
Tennessee 6-Mar 12.0%
Vermont 6-Mar 15.4%
Virginia 6-Mar 9.6%
Kansas 10-Mar 24.0%
Alabama 13-Mar 5.9%
Mississippi 13-Mar 8.7%
Illinois 20-Mar 10.8%
Louisiana 24-Mar 11.8%
District of Columbia 3-Apr 17.5%
Maryland 3-Apr 12.8%
Wisconsin 3-Apr 10.3%
Texas 3-Apr 10.9%
Connecticut 24-Apr 8.7%
Delaware 24-Apr 9.1%
New York 24-Apr 13.8%
Pennsylvania 24-Apr 34.2%
Rhode Island 24-Apr 14.9%
Indiana 8-May 16.5%
North Carolina 8-May 15.5%
West Virginia 8-May 10.8%
Nebraska 15-May 27.9%
Oregon 15-May 31.4%
Arkansas 22-May 10.3%
Kentucky 22-May 14.6%
California 5-Jun 11.5%
Montana 5-Jun 18.3%
New Jersey 5-Jun 10.4%
New Mexico 5-Jun 30.2%
South Dakota 5-Jun 35.5%
Utah 26-Jun 6.3%

I think that this forecast underestimates Paul’s support in next week’s New Hampshire primary, because it does not take into account the increase in Free State Project activists in that state. Nevertheless, it should be clear what a daunting task Paul faces. Even if he hits 20-22% in New Hampshire, he is not likely to be competitive in South Carolina and Florida, both of which are dominated by socially conservative defense hawks in the former case and older voters in the latter, and both of which are primaries, where Paul has usually done far less well.

However, if Paul can manage to beat expectations there, he stands a decent chance of winning the Nevada, Minnesota, and Maine caucuses and placing second in Colorado. A string of strong performances just might set him up to beat these forecasts in the next few states, especially if he becomes the anti-Romney anti-Santorum by default. After Super Tuesday, Paul faces a potential long dry spell of primary states in which he does not do particularly well. It’s hard to see how he does not get eliminated from contention for the nomination during this period, unless he really manages to build momentum out of New Hampshire and the early February contests.

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