Posts Tagged ‘kantianism’

“Imagine that a Wall Street billionaire is passing a bag lady on the street. She begs for a dollar. Should the billionaire give it to her? It’s just plain obvious that the bag lady would benefit more from the dollar than the billionaire. The donation would detract from his happiness less than it would add to hers. Therefore, interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, and these comparisons ground our eleemosynary duties.”

So runs a familiar thought experiment beloved of utilitarians and consequentialists about property (like Rawlsians). Indeed, to deny that interpersonal comparisons of utility are ever possible seems willfully obtuse. Moreover, to deny that there are any eleemosynary duties is heartless and wrong. What I wish to challenge here is the idea that interpersonal comparisons of utility ground those duties.

Just as the original scenario resorts to the intuition pump, I shall do the same. This scenario is likewise intended to illustrate clear differences in utility across persons.

Imagine that you have been fairly well-off. Two formerly well-off friends of yours have, however, fallen on hard times. They have lost their jobs and run through their savings. They have sold their houses, moved into cramped, run-down apartments, and are generally living a hand-to-mouth existence in which they lack some of the “primary goods” needed for a decent life, such as the ability to save for the future. One friend bewails his condition constantly; he is clearly deeply unhappy due to his financial circumstances (but not suicidal). The other friend seems to accept his lot with relative cheerfulness; while he regards his financial circumstances, which are just as bad as those of the other friend, as a serious difficulty, he maintains an optimistic view on life and on the whole is not terribly unhappy.

Which of these friends is more deserving of your support, or are they equally deserving? For the utilitarian, the answer is clear: the unhappier friend deserves more financial assistance, as financial assistance will do more to raise his spirits. But is that the right answer? Intuitively, it is not. Intuitively, the second friend deserves as much support as the first, and we might even be more favorably disposed to aid the second friend — while we pity the first, we admire the resilience of the second and want to see that character trait rewarded.

Is there any principle beside the principle of utility that our intuition would support? I suggest (more…)

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Pileus is a “virtue libertarian” blog, but we tend to write much more about the latter than the former. This post is different. I make the case that consumption of pornography is immoral but, because it does not violate anyone else’s rights (leaving aside the case of child pornography), it should not be legally prohibited or discouraged. Therefore, this is a post about ethics, not politics. Unfortunately, libertarians have too often confused the two (a good example is Reason‘s wall-to-wall, comrades-in-arms coverage of porn magnate John Stagliano’s trial.)

Libertarians have often been uncomfortable with the idea of self-regarding duties. How could you ever violate a moral duty to yourself? But a moment’s reflection reveals that people divide the self all the time. We apparently believe that it is possible to respect oneself, or to fail to respect oneself, to esteem oneself, or to fail to esteem oneself. There doesn’t seem to be anything semantically or philosophically problematic about the idea that one could fail to do everything for oneself that one could. Imagine a person who is a pure altruist – who never takes care of his own needs but instead lives his life completely for others. He makes himself the slave of others. Surely we would say that this person is being insufficiently selfish, that he is disrespecting his own dignity. It is possible not to do enough for one’s own interests or dignity.

So self-regarding duties exist. But is there a duty not to consume pornography? Conservatives (more…)

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