More on the Cheonan Incident

In case you miss it in the comments, Rob Farley at LGM responds to my post and adds more thoughts on North Korea and the Cheonan Incident.

In case you are wondering, Rob is not one of my senior colleagues on my P and T committee.  He’s just an interesting guy, hence all the links!

2 thoughts on “More on the Cheonan Incident

  1. The key places to look for indicators about the intentions behind this attack and likely outcomes are the first two days of coverage/statements. I think Grover is right to see this as a feint towards a simmering war. The torpedo explanation was downplayed immediately in statements. NK is smart enough to watch closely how Seoul deals with the situation regardless of whether the incident was planned, was the result of in-sub-ordnance-ation, or if an NK minisub simply got caught at the wrong place, wrong time, and shot its way out of a tight spot. NK has gained a lot of useful information from how this has played out, insights they’ve immediately put into action by firing a land “torp” at ROK investment by seizing the resorts. One issue I’d like to see more discussion of is the frequency of NK undersea incursions below the Northern Limit Line.

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