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Unless the polls are systematically biased or there is a late-breaking surge in support for “Yes,” the “No” campaign looks set to squeak by with a narrow victory in the Scottish independence referendum. On the betting markets, a “Yes” vote has plunged below an implied probability of 20%. What has this decline in the prospects for independence done to capital markets? In my last post on the subject, I found that British firms and the pound were nearly untouched by what was at the time significant momentum for “Yes,” but that a nine-firm Scottish equity index was hit hard. If those losses reflected unease about independence, then the latest news should have caused growth in my Scottish equity index.

The biggest decline in the Yes team’s chances actually came overnight September 11-12, when the chances of Scottish independence abruptly fell about 10 percentage points on the release of new polls in the evening of September 11. (For a full list of recent polls, see Wikipedia.) The Yougov poll showing “No” in the lead (a dramatic reversal from its previous poll) seems to have been leaked just before the closing bell on September 11.

betfair independence odds

Accordingly, I examine the performance of the Scottish equity index on the London Stock Exchange between 4:30 PM and 5:00 PM local time on September 11, when the odds of Scottish independence declined so rapidly. These are the nine stocks I include in the index: SL, SSE, FGP, WEIR, SGC, AGGK, WG, ADN, and MNZS. Of these, eight of nine rose on the poll news. Again, I weight by each stock by its market cap to create the index. The index rose 0.5% on the news, a rather small increase compared to the 1.7% decline after the shock Yougov poll showing “Yes” ahead. The overall patterns were pretty similar, though. The two transportation companies, Firstgroup and Stagecoach Group, were basically unchanged between the two. Energy-linked firms and Standard Life led gainers. Aggreko (temperature control systems) registered a small gain, and Aberdeen Asset Management a somewhat larger one.

Roughly a ten-percentage-point drop in independence likelihood led to a 0.5% gain in the value of Scottish equities, less than a third of the loss in Scottish equities after an eight-percentage-point gain in independence likelihood just a few days prior. On balance, these results suggest we should revise downward the costs of secession suggested by the prior post.

One objection to this interpretation might be that the leak of the Yougov poll just before the closing bell gave traders little time to respond. But this does not appear to be the case. The Scottish equity index was flat at the opening bell on September 12, suggesting that there was no new information for traders to consider.

Here are two more interpretations. First, betting markets are less liquid and well-capitalized than financial markets. The actual gain in the probability of Scottish independence after the first Yougov poll may have been greater than the immediate response on betting markets. Second, the shock of a poll actually showing “Yes” ahead may have led traders to overestimate the likelihood of Scottish independence, and perhaps even the costs of secession (in a moment of panic). Having been inured to the initial shock and its aftermath, traders then took later news with more equanimity.

Overall, though, the results are still suggesting net economic costs to Scottish independence. How much of the emphasis should be put on the “Scottish” part of that phrase and how much on “independence” remains a matter of debate, but clearly energy and financial firms are more affected than transportation and service ones.

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What can we learn from capital markets about the likely consequences of Scottish independence? A trio of recent polls has shown the “Yes” side to have pulled roughly even with “No.” With momentum on their side, it’s not unthinkable at all that “Yes” will pull it out, resulting in the first secession from a Western democracy since Iceland withdrew from Danish union in 1944. Most American commentators, from Paul Krugman to Tyler Cowen, oppose Scottish independence and forecast economic disaster for the new country. Are they right?

Let’s look at the behavior of capital markets in Britain since these polls’ release to find out. First, let’s set the stage by looking at how betting markets price the probability of Scottish independence. Unfortunately, there are no nice InTrade-style charts for implicit probabilities anymore, at least not that I can access from the United States. From oddschecker.com, I am able to pull odds from different exchanges from the beginning and end of each day. Looking at the markets with most liquidity, it looks as if the odds for independence moved from about 19.5% Friday night to about 25% Saturday night, after the release of the YouGov and Panelbase polls (the Panelbase poll suggested “No” might still have a small lead). On Monday morning the odds stood at about 23.3%. After the release of the TNS poll Monday evening (confirming the dead heat), the odds moved in to 26.0%.

Next, let’s look at the behavior of capital markets over this period. Here is how the pound has fared against the euro:

euros per pound

Not much of a correlation. To be sure, the pound fell against the euro when trading opened Monday morning, following the shock weekend poll from Yougov and the somewhat-reassuring poll from Panelbase, but the TNS poll released late Monday night appears to have had zero effect on the pound, even though it did have a small effect on the betting markets.

Now, the pound has fared a little worse against the dollar, because the euro has also dropped against the dollar. This may reflect that traders believe Scottish independence raises the probability of British exit from the EU. But this would not be a direct cost of Scottish independence, and it would ultimately be up to English, Welsh, and Northern Irish voters whether they want to withdraw from the EU.

What about the stock market?

dowftse

I’ve got the Dow in there for comparison (in green). So the FTSE fell about 0.3% on opening Monday, then drifted downward throughout the day, finally recovering all that ground except the initial 0.3% drop. On opening Tuesday after the TNS poll, it actually rose. As of this writing is down just about 0.4% from Friday’s close. This looks like a muted response to me.

But what about Scottish-exposed stocks in particular? I took the list of top 25 Scottish companies here and winnowed the list down to those listed as having Scottish ownership and being publicly traded. Nine companies fit that test. I then constructed a weighted average of their share prices at Friday close, Monday open, Monday close, and Tuesday open, the weights being each stock’s market cap according to investing.com. Recall that there were two surprise polls, one over the weekend and one released Monday evening, the former having the greater effect on betting markets.

The Scottish index I created lost 1.7% of its value on opening Monday morning, a noteworthy drop because it happened right away. It’s plausible to attribute this drop to the increased risk of independence. However, today it lost nothing on opening – in fact, it was up 0.1%. Still, the total loss to these nine firms’ market value amounts to about $800 million. The fact that there was no further response of capital markets to the TNS poll, even though betting markets did respond, weakens our confidence somewhat that investors are responding negatively to the prospect of independence, but let us work with the assumption that they are.

What would happen to these firms’ value if independence were dead certain? Expected utility analysis helps us here. They lost $800 million in value on an increase in the probability of independence of 5.5+2.7=8.2%. We can infer that an increase from 20% to 100% would wipe out $800 million*8/.6=$7.8 billion. That’s a fair proportion of their existing value: about 16%. Of course, investors are risk averse, and the very uncertainty of the outcome might be driving a fair proportion of the losses.

A closer look reveals that different stocks responded differently to the poll news. Two transportation companies, FirstGroup and Stagecoach Group, lost virtually nothing, and Aggreko, which rents temperature control systems, lost absolutely nothing. Financial and energy/power companies were pounded. An engineering company closely linked to the oil industry, the Weir Group, took a more modest 1.0% loss.

How to sum up? So far (more…)

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A casualty of “pro-consumer” financial regulation. John Stossel is on the story:

Today, Americans were told that they must close their Intrade.com accounts. That happened because the federal government agency known as the “Commodity Futures Trading Commission” (CFTC) today sued the prediction market, where people from all over the world bet about things like who will win elections.

Intrade decided all its U.S. customers must now close their accounts and withdraw their money from the site.

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As the economy slowly claws its way out of the financial crisis and the deepest and most prolonged recession since the Great Depression, it is good to know that some of the lending practices that contributed to the collapse are once again being deployed. As Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Tara Siegel explain in today’s NYT:

as financial institutions recover from the losses on loans made to troubled borrowers, some of the largest lenders to the less than creditworthy, including Capital One and GM Financial, are trying to woo them back, while HSBC and JPMorgan Chase are among those tiptoeing again into subprime lending.

Credit card lenders gave out 1.1 million new cards to borrowers with damaged credit in December, up 12.3 percent from the same month a year earlier, according to Equifax’s credit trends report released in March. These borrowers accounted for 23 percent of new auto loans in the fourth quarter of 2011, up from 17 percent in the same period of 2009, Experian, a credit scoring firm, said.

But I thought the new regulations were going to put an end to these practices? No, in fact, they have stimulated their return:

The banks, for their part, are looking to make up the billions in fee income wiped out by regulations enacted after the financial crisis by focusing on two parts of their business — the high and the low ends — industry consultants say. Subprime borrowers typically pay high interest rates, up to 29 percent, and often rack up fees for late payments.

Thankfully, “the push for subprime borrowers has not extended to the mortgage market, which remains closed to all but the most creditworthy.”  My guess: it is only a matter of time until these practices revert to the old normal.

As most accounts of the financial crisis suggest, moral hazard was a significant problem.  Financial institutions assumed that they could act with reckless abandon and assume risk but the costs, should things collapse, would be socialized by the government. The events of the past few years have only reinforced this assumption.

As Solomon remarked:

 “As a dog returns to his vomit, so a fool repeats his folly.”   Proverbs 26:11

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Since the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, a consensus among even free-market economists has been developing: financial liberalization for developing countries usually don’t make sense. The financial crisis of 2008 and the ongoing Eurozone crisis have only fortified this consensus. The mainstream economic position seems to be that, at least for developing countries with smaller markets and poorly trained regulators, restrictions on capital account transactions in liquid portfolio assets often make sense.

Even the usually reliably free-market, pro-globalization economist Jagdish Bhagwati writes in his popular book, In Defense of Globalization, that the East Asian financial crisis

…was a product of hasty and imprudent financial liberalization, almost always under foreign pressure, allowing free international flows of short-term capital without adequate attention to the potentially potent downside of such globalization. There has been no shortage of excuses and strained explanations blaming the victims… [T]he motivation underlying these specious explanations is a desire to continue to maintain ideological positions in favor of a policy of free capital flows or to escape responsibility for playing a central role in pushing for… gung-ho international financial capitalism. (199-200)

Strong words! And then there’s this (more…)

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This working paper is already getting substantial attention, and it’s not hard to see why. They find that banks that lobbied more in the years leading up to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008 received more money through TARP. What’s particularly astounding is the rate of return, which they estimate at between $485 and $585 per dollar spent in lobbying.

I suppose there are two ways to look at this. One is to become outraged at the profitability of lobbying and the fact that money buys influence in Washington — but who is really surprised by that? The other way to look at it is that despite the flood of rents available, rent-seeking seems to be far less than theory would predict. Theory predicts that banks should spend up to about 1/2 the amount they could reasonably expect to receive, and that total expenditures on rent-seeking could even be greater than the rents available. Perhaps the reason standard rent-seeking models don’t apply in this case is that a program the size of TARP was unforeseeable until just days before it happened.

In any event, the findings certainly betray the common assertion from political leadership that the program was simply a practical response to the financial crisis aimed at preventing another Great Depression.

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For many libertarians, the single most important policy reform today would be abolishing the Federal Reserve and replacing it with competing currencies issued by unregulated, private banks. Ron Paul has repeatedly introduced bills to abolish the Fed and has made the issue a key theme of his presidential campaigns. Many libertarians get involved in efforts to use silver as a medium of exchange, such as the Liberty Dollar and Shire Silver.

Why do so many libertarians think that abolishing the Fed should take such a high priority? Some economists have explored the history and theory of “free banking,” such as Larry White and George Selgin. But I suspect many libertarians derive their monetary ideas not from reading White or Selgin, but from Ron Paul or lurid, conspiratorial books like The Creature from Jekyll Island. One commonly encounters views such as, “The Fed is creating hyperinflation that will destroy the value of the dollar,” and, “The Fed prints money to fund the government’s war machine.”

It’s important to note that these views are not correct. The main way that the Fed creates money is by (more…)

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